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1. Background 
Motivation for the review   
Contract farming is a commercial relationship between a firm and a group of farmers. It is a business 
model in which production is bought in advance by a firm in exchange for certain services and other 
benefits. Although principally a commercial initiative, contract farming is considered to be a way to 
overcome the challenges that small farmers face when linking to remunerative markets. It assists 
farmers in connecting to output markets and often provides inputs, credit, or agricultural extension 
(Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; World Bank, 2007; Da Silva and Ranking, 2013). These services can be not 
only provided by private firms, but can also come from, or be facilitated by, multi-actor partnerships 
between companies, governments and NGOs (Prowse, 2012). Estimates of the incidence of contract 
farming in developing countries are unreliable and differ markedly between countries; they are 
generally below 10% of total area under production (Minot and Ronchi, 2015). A rapidly growing 
number of firms – at least in modern market channels – are increasingly relying on contract 
procurement (Da Silva and Ranking, 2013).  
Companies may offer a contract only to those farmers who comply with some minimum requirements 
(for example land ownership, irrigated lands, minimal plot sizes, etc.) which may preclude smaller 
farms from benefitting directly. Even if these arrangements are beneficial for smallholders directly or 
indirectly through spill-over effects, there will likely be heterogeneity in impacts, with certain farmers 
benefitting while others do not or even lose out. It is clear that contracts will not be randomly 
distributed within a farming community, and contracting farmers will always have special 
characteristics, or so-called firm-selection and self-selection biases (Minot and Ronchi, 2015; Barrett 
et al., 2012). Studies that infer quantitative effects of contract farming on income and food security 
will need a proper research design to control for these biases. 
Public policies and institutions influence the market strategies and forms of transaction used between 
farmers and firms. Contracting firms are almost always relatively large processors, exporters, or 
supermarket chains. Rarely do small-scale traders or even wholesalers offer farmers pre-planting 
contracts. This is not surprising, given the large fixed costs associated with contracting (Minot and 
Ronchi, 2015). Contract farming is induced by a firm’s need to source products with specific qualities 
and in sufficient quantities (Minot and Ronchi, 2015) and the presence of appropriate geographical 
and political-economic conditions and an enabling business environment (Jia and Bijman, 2013). 
Relevant geographical conditions are road infrastructure, access to water, soil types, climate, etc. 
Relevant political-economic conditions are land-rights policies, market regulation, trade policies and 
the risk of socio-economic shocks. Whether a firm chooses to start offering a contract farming 
arrangement is also highly influenced by the local business environment, such as financial services, 
conflict resolution systems, investment subsidies, business development services, brokering services, 
and farmer organisations. Many of the above-mentioned conditions are influenced by political 
decision-making. Therefore, policy makers can enable or constrain the opportunities for contract 
farming, influencing its attractiveness to firms and farmers as a way of organising transactions and 
embedded services. Since 2007, coinciding with the investor rush for land in sub-Saharan Africa, 
international development agencies have increasingly presented contract farming as an alternative or 
complementary development opportunity for smallholder inclusion (Lindholm, 2014). 
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Contract farming is considered by most authors to be a positive development for the inclusion of 
farmers in markets (Minot, 1986; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), food security (Bellemare and Novak, 
2015), and global poverty reduction (Setboonsarng and Leung, 2014). Yet, there is serious concern 
whether smallholders are able to benefit from these arrangements, because the relative size of buyers 
most likely results in an unequal power relationship, which influences the terms of the arrangements 
(Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008; von Hagen and Alvarez, 2011). 
In the earlier literature on contract farming, the issue of power imbalances was especially prominent 
(Little and Watts, 1994), and the discussion was rather polarised between proponents and critics of 
contract farming (Oya, 2012). Recent literature, however, has paid more attention to diversity within 
contract farming arrangements, and, for example, acknowledges the complex interactions involved in 
a contract farming scheme and how farmers and firms make use of their constrained room for 
manoeuvre (Vellema, 2002; Minot and Ronchi, 2015).  
Though, contract farming is the outcome of a complex process influenced by many different factors 
and in which policies and projects shape the enabling environment in which a firm and a farmer agree 
on a contract, policy makers, international organisations propose  (Lindholm, 2014), and many 
scholars study (Minot and Ronchi, 2015; Da Silva and Ranking, 2013), contract farming as a way to 
improve the inclusion of farmer in markets, and consider it a development strategy.  Although it is not 
a well-defined, standard ‘treatment’, we think that a comparison of these effectiveness studies on 
various empirical instances of contract farming will give an overview of the evidence base behind 
support to contract farming as a development strategy and can derive useful policy recommendations 
that have wider application.  
Many studies in the past compared the incomes of participating and non-participating farmers, or 
incomes before and after the signing of the contract, and have a high risk of selection bias: e.g., rich 
farmers may participate more than poor farmers, etc. This results in unreliable effect estimates that 
are more a reflection of selection bias or confounding factors (e.g., weather or prices) than of the 
contract farming arrangement itself. The last decade shows a rapid increase of studies on contract 
farming that assess the effects of contract farming using quasi-experimental research designs, which 
provide much more reliable estimates. As can be expected, these studies report mixed effects (Minot 
and Ronchi, 2015).  
These impact evaluations assess the effects of specific instances of contract farming on smallholders. 
Therefore, a systematic review of this rapidly growing body of evidence is timely, and may help to 
distil generalised inferences from these specific instances. To do so, our review follows a two-stage 
process. First, it identifies and discusses the results of impact studies that applied a research design to 
reduce selection bias and assess the counterfactual situation (What would have happened to the 
smallholder farmers had there been no contract farming arrangement?). The review compares the 
inferences in these studies and assesses the strength of the evidence behind them, as well as the 
rigour of the methods used. Secondly, it places these contractual arrangements in context. The review 
maps the relevant contextual conditions and elements of the enabling environment for each of the 
empirical instances of contract farming covered by these studies, searching for missing information 
through a targeted information search around each of these instances of contract farming, and making 
a case-based comparative analysis in order to distill recommendations for policy makers and 
practitioners.  
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Description of Contract Farming 
Contractual arrangements in agriculture can be extremely diverse, with varying embedded services, 
credit arrangements, payment systems and price-setting mechanisms. Contract farming is generally 
defined very broadly as ‘agricultural production carried out according to an agreement between a 
buyer and farmers, which establishes conditions for the production and marketing of a farm product 
or products’ (http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/contract-farming/faq). We focus on a more strict definition 
of contract farming, partly based on Prowse (2012), where there is a direct sales agreement between 
a firm and a farmer before production begins, and the farmer gets seeds, inputs or credit to pay his or 
her production costs.  
In this review, contract farming is defined as, "a contractual arrangement for a fixed term between a 
farmer and a firm, agreed verbally or in writing, before production begins, which provides material or 
financial resources to the farmer and specifies one or more product or process requirements, for 
agricultural production on land owned or controlled by the farmer, which gives the firm legal title to 
(most of) the crop". 
There are many different types of contracts, going from full resource provisioning contracts with 
detailed production and marketing conditions to a mere verbal agreement to buy whatever quantity 
is produced at the going market price. Therefore, for each empirical instance of contract farming in 
the studies selected for synthesis, we will map the differences in embedded services provided and 
contractual conditions, such as payment systems, quality control, dispute resolution, etc. included in 
each of the contracts. We note these contextual conditions in order to find predictors of effectiveness 
for smallholders, and to distil good practices that can be used to fine-tune the contracts with the aim 
of increasing smallholder income and food security.  
Theory of Change for contract farming  
This review will synthesise the documented positive, negative, intended, and unintended outcomes 
of the contract farming arrangements. The intended effects of the contractual arrangements for the 
contracting farmers are to be found in the outcomes directly related to the contracted production, 
such as improved agricultural practices, improved yields and improved crop revenue. Non-contracted 
farmers may experience spill-over effects (e.g., information and technology obtained from 
neighbours). Contract farming might also have negative outcomes, including exposure to financial risk, 
health and food safety. Most effects can be expected only when the contract is continued for several 
years by firm and farmers. However, even if one of the parties decides to break or discontinue the 
contract after a short time, some changes in agricultural practices may have resulted in positive or 
negative intermediate or ultimate outcomes.  
As in Ton et al.’s 2015 review of the impact research on innovation grants (Ton et al., 2015; Ton et al., 
2013), we will outline the range of proxy-indicators, outcome areas and effects that have been used 
to assess the impact of contract farming on the livelihood strategies of smallholder farmers.  
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Outcome areas 
Following Barrett et al (2012), we identify four stages of decision-making by contracting parties 
concerned that are required to lead to outcomes for smallholders. 
Figure 1. Process of establishing a contract farming arrangement 
 
In stage 1, a firm chooses their procurement location; next, in stage 2, the firm proposes a contract to 
a (specific group) of farmers, which these farmers may accept. The firm may deliberately restrict the 
contract to those farmers complying with specific characteristics. Stage 3 is the acceptance of the 
contract details by the farmer(s). The firm and smallholder then decide to honour the contract for its 
duration, which we consider to be stage 4. A farmer organisation, (local) government, financial 
institution and/or NGO may play a role in brokering this agreement. Subsequently, farmers accept the 
proposal, and agree to be part of the contractual arrangement. After each agricultural cycle or contract 
period, the parties may decide to either stop or renew their arrangements. The latter is dependent on 
the fixed investments made by each of the contracting parties, and the alternative use of these 
investments outside the contract arrangement. For example, discontinuation of a contract with a firm 
after having planted perennial crops (e.g., for biofuels) will imply higher costs than when stopping a 
specific (variety of) vegetable production. 
Immediate outcomes of a contract farming arrangement are, thus, related to the uptake and renewal 
of contracts. The length of time that the contractual arrangement has been active will be taken into 
account in the narrative discussion of findings in each study. The continuation of a contractual 
arrangement is an indicator of an overall satisfaction of the firm and the farmers with their contractual 
arrangement. Discontinuation of a contract (drop-outs) could signal that, at least in the short run, the 
firm or the farmer consider it suboptimal and not in their interest to renew. There may also be side-
selling, where farmers sell to another buyer than the one with whom they are contracted. Figure 2 
illustrates the incentive structure for firms and farmers to decide to enter and renew a contractual 
arrangement. This negotiation process implies that, in time, the content of the contract and the 
characteristics of the contracting parties will change.  
Effects on smallholders will be greater for contract farming arrangements that are in place for a longer 
time, because investments in productive assets and knowledge take time to bear fruit. It is likely that 
unsuccessful farmers will have left the arrangement. Research by Narayanan (2013) in India suggests 
that farmers may move in and out of contracts quite regularly, thus indicating a potential difference 
between observed short-term dynamics and a more structural mid-term effect on the (local) 
institutional environment. In the long run, contractual arrangements between firms and farmers may 
become a common phenomenon, and one of the available business options for production/marketing.  
 
Stage 1: 
Firm choice of a 
procurement location
Stage 2: 
Firm contract offer
Stage 3: 
Smallholder contract acceptance
Stage 4: 
Firm and smallholder decisions 
to honor the contract
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Figure 2.  Contractual arrangements as a result of a negotiation process and influencing factors. 
 
Intermediate outcomes are indicators of contract performance and productivity. Input-providing 
contracts are believed to be most beneficial for the poorest farmers, as they lack the financial capacity 
to invest in these inputs themselves and they do not have access to finances that would enable them 
to buy these inputs on credit. In this way, contract farming becomes a form of ‘inclusive business’ 
(Vorley and Proctor, 2008). Ultimately, the increased value of agricultural production under contract 
should increase household income, or could increase household food security by providing more 
stable or less uncertain incomes. Finally, improved productivity in the contracted crop could spread 
to other crops, resulting in an additional increase in income, or, if the crops are for home consumption, 
improved household food security (Minten et al., 2009). Effects on intermediate outcomes can be 
visible over a shorter time-span than changes in ultimate outcomes, such as household income and 
food security. It is nevertheless more challenging to compare the immediate and intermediate 
outcomes between different contract farming instances, because the indicators used to measure 
these outcomes tend to be context- and product specific and rely on different constructs and ways of 
measurement.  Our review will systematically map the proxy-indicators used by each author and try 
to apply meta-analysis on various impact areas (grouping similar proxy-indicators) in the chain of 
effect- immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes – indicating if and why the contexts, 
treatment and outcomes are deemed sufficiently comparable. We set out the following intended 
intermediate outcome areas with our coding tool (see Figure 3): improved agricultural practices, 
improved yields, and improved crop revenue. As unintended intermediate outcomes, we will map 
information on financial risk exposure, health and food safety. Our meta-analysis will be limited to the 
intended outcomes, as these are most commonly measured in the studies on effectiveness. 
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Figure 3. Outcome areas that result from the contractual arrangement 
 
 
The ultimate outcomes of contract farming arrangements are income and food security of smallholder 
farmers. The causal link between changes in these ultimate outcomes and the contract farming 
arrangements is not always clearcut, especially when contract farming covers only a small part of a 
farmer’s agricultural activities. For smaller contract farming schemes, net-effects on ultimate 
outcomes might be difficult to detect with quasi-experimental research designs, due to the (likely) 
lower effect size (Ton et al., 2014b). We map the following ultimate outcome areas with our coding 
tool in order to conduct the meta-analysis (see Figure 2): (intra-) household income, market power, 
and household food security. Other outcomes on livelihood strategies of participating and non-
participation farmers are discussed in the narrative synthesis.  
Whenever the studies give empirical evidence about development impact, e.g. poverty alleviation, 
economic growth, national food security and employment, we will distil this information, and use it in 
a narrative discussion about each empirical instance. It is unlikely that there are studies that quantify 
effects at this outcome level; most study will narratively explain if and how the intermediate and 
ultimate outcomes contributed to these broader outcome areas. There are also expected outcomes 
for traders, suppliers and non-beneficiary farmers, on which available evidence will be collected (see 
below).  
Barriers and enablers 
We will explore plausible enablers and barriers of effectiveness in the instances of contract farming 
for which good-quality evidence on effects is available. Figure 4 includes the conditions and 
characteristics that we consider potential enablers or barriers: the policy context, enabling 
environment, and the characteristics of the firms, the farmers and the crops. This list is not exclusive. 
For each empirical instance, we will search for information on these influencing factors. Most of this 
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information will be qualitative in nature. This part of the study is geared to making policy 
recommendations about potential ‘recipes’ of enabling conditions that can be expected to improve 
the positive effects of contract farming in income and food security of smallholders, and reduce the 
negative effects. These factors are further refined in the coding tool provided in the methods section. 
    Figure 4. Factors incorporated in the coding tool to explore for predictors of effectiveness 
 
 
STARTING CONDITIONS
(PROCUREMENT LOCATION)
PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES
INDIVIDUAL FARMER CHARACTERISTICS
COMPANY ATTRIBUTES
SMALLHOLDER CHARACTERISTICS
ORGANISATION
OF PRODUCTION
(e.g. OUTGROWER, 
NUCLEUS ESTATE)
OWNERSHIP
(e.g. PRIVATE-LED, 
STATE-LED, FARMER -
LED) 
SOCIAL CAPTIAL
(e.g. FARMER 
ORGANISATION, 
CULTURAL HERITAGE)
HUMAN CAPITAL
(e.g. LITERACY, 
SKILLS)
PHYSICAL CAPITAL
(e.g.  DISTANCE TO 
MARKETS, ROADS)
FINANCIAL CAPTAL
(e.g. RICH/POOR)
NATURAL CAPITAL
(e.g. LAND, WATER, 
FOREST)
NATIONALITY
(e.g. FOREIGN, MIXED, 
DOMESTIC)
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS
CROP CHARACTERISTICS
YIELDS 
(QUANTITY AND 
QUALITY)
PROFITABILITY
SELF 
CONSUMPTION
THRESHOLD 
INVESTMENTS
PERISHABILITY
PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
POLITICAL ECONOMY BUSINESS EVIRONMENTGEOGRAPHIC 
CONDITIONS
LAND RIGHTS POLICY
(e.g. POSSIBILITY FOR 
DIRECT OPERATED 
PLANTATIONS)
STAKEHOLDER 
PARTNERSHIPS (e.g. 
SUBSIDIES, 
FACILITATION.)
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
SERVICES
(e.g. SECTOR SUPPORT 
POLICIES)
THIRD PARTY QUALITY 
VERIFICATION 
SYSTEMS
PRESENCE OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES
HISTORY OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC SHOCKS
MARKET 
REGULATIONS (e.g. 
PRICE POLICIES, 
EXCHANGE RATES, 
TARIFFS)
MARKETS AND 
COMPETITION
 (e.g.  LOCAL SPOT 
MARKET, OTHER 
PROCESSORS)
CLIMATE
SOIL TYPE
ACCESS TO WATER 
(e.g. RAINFAL, 
IRRIGATION)
ACCESS TO 
MARKETS (e.g. 
DISTANCE TO 
ROADS, HARBOURS, 
AIRPORTS)
RELIABLE LEGAL 
SYSTEM
SOCIAL CHARACTERSTICS
SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF 
PRODUCTION
(e.g. CLASS 
DIFFERENTIATION, 
FARMING STRUCTURE)
CULTURAL HERITAGE 
(e.g. CASTE, 
IDENTITY, COMMON 
POOL RESOURCES)
GENDER RELATIONS
 9 
Why it is Important to do This Review 
The body of literature on contract farming is growing rapidly. Moreover, a preliminary scan of the 
literature revealed that there is a great heterogeneity in contract farming, with differences in 
contracts, farmers, products, buyers, and institutional environments. In spite of this heterogeneity, a 
systematic review of these studies is important, in order to extract some generalised inferences from 
the accumulated knowledge about the effects of contract farming, intended and unintended, direct 
and indirect. The review will synthesise the research which has been done, identifying commonalities 
and differences, generalizable and context-specific findings, and exploring the evidence for lessons 
learned that may improve current and future contract farming arrangements. 
It is important to improve the context for contract farming arrangements in order to generate positive 
effects for smallholder farmers, in the light of the existing body of evidence. The Population Division 
of the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs expects the world population to reach 9.6 billion 
by 2050, of which 6.3 billion are expected to live in cities (United Nations Population Division, 2014). 
The agricultural production required to feed this growing and mostly urban population needs to come 
from more intensive use of land already used for agriculture, as there is little unused land left in the 
world. Farms smaller than five hectares occupy almost three-quarters of farmland in low-income 
countries and almost two-thirds in the lower-middle income countries (FAO IFAD WFP, 2014). Most of 
these farmers are poor (World Bank, 2007), which makes research to better understand the 
effectiveness of contract farming and the ways that it can improve their market power, income, and 
food security a potentially relevant instrument for poverty alleviation. We are not aware of any 
completed systematic reviews on the effectiveness of contract farming to overcome these challenges.1  
The review is timely. Policy makers are increasingly interested in working with the private sector in 
development initiatives, using co-investment or developing joint projects. The involvement of the 
private sector in the international development agenda is growing rapidly. A good example of this is 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, but there are many similar initiatives. 
Therefore, this review not only aims to map the evidence about the effects that contract farming has 
had on income and food security of smallholder farmers, according to studies with a strong research 
design, but it aims also to show what seems to be working, when, and under which conditions. It is 
also a unique opportunity to identify knowledge gaps to direct further research on the topic.  
 
                                                          
1 There is an on-going Campbell review on the effectiveness of agricultural certification schemes (Oya et al., 
2015).  
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2. Objectives 
Our systematic review will use the following questions to guide the review and synthesis process. 
These questions are divided into two sets. 
Question 1: What is known about the size of effects of contract farming on income and food security 
of smallholder farmers in low- and middle income countries? 
1.1 What are the effects of the contract farming arrangement on ultimate outcomes such as 
household income and food security? 
1.2 What are the effects of the contract farming arrangement on intermediate outcomes such as 
agricultural practices, yields and/or net-returns derived from producing the contracted crop? 
1.3 What are the effects on intermediate and ultimate outcomes for non-participating 
neighbouring farmers living in the same communities as the contract farmers? 
1.4 What are the drop-out rates and side-selling associated with the contract farming arrangement 
(immediate outcomes)? 
 
Question 2: Under what enabling or limiting conditions are contract farming arrangements effective 
for improving income and food security of smallholders? 
2.1. What are the enabling and disabling conditions that explain the effectiveness and sustainability 
of the contract farming arrangements for smallholder famers? 
2.2. Are there configurations of conditions that may enable success or failure of contract farming 
arrangements?  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Criteria for considering studies for this review 
In the review we will use several criteria to select studies useful for answering the research questions. 
As a first step, we aim to identify studies with an experimental or quasi-experimental design that 
assess the effects of the contract farming on income and food security of smallholder farmers in 
developing countries. Once these empirical instances have been selected, in a second step we will 
search for additional information (qualitative studies, background information) to reflect on the 
conditions and dynamics in the empirical instances associated with these studies, to identify enablers 
and barriers to the effectiveness of these contract farming arrangements. The quality (rigour) of the 
methods to support conclusions in these information sources will be assessed using the critical 
appraisal tool used in the systematic review on farmer field schools (Waddington et al., 2014). 
The criteria to select the effectiveness studies in the first step are described below following the PICOS 
format (Participants, Intervention, Comparisons, Outcomes, Study design).  
Types of Participants 
The review will focus on the effectiveness of contractual arrangements for smallholders farmers. We 
will also include studies that assess effects on other stakeholder groups than farmers, whenever these 
concern agricultural land in areas where also smallholder farmers are located. As the evidence base, 
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we will include empirical studies that cover contractual arrangements in low-income economies, 
lower-middle income economies and upper-middle income economies, according to the World Bank, 
at the time of data-collection.  To sketch the range of dimensions relevant for the definition of 
smallholder farms, we will report the definition used by the authors of the primary studies, and discuss 
these according to four criteria proposed by Stewart et al. (2014):  
1. Limited size of farm (as compared to other farms in the sector) 
2. Mostly dependent on family labour 
3. Subsistence farming or mix of subsistence and market-oriented farming 
4. Reportedly limited resources in terms of land, technical and technological support, and/or 
capital for maintenance and investment. 
 
Types of Interventions 
The interventions studied cover a specific type of contractual arrangement in agriculture, which are 
agreed for fixed term between a farmer and a firm, verbally or in writing, before production begins 
for agricultural production on land owned or controlled by the farmer. Such agreements provide 
material or financial resources to the farmer and specify one or more product or process 
requirements, and give the firm legal title to the crop. While the intervention is usually initiated 
between firms and smallholder farmers, we will also include relevant public policies, programmes and 
projects which aim to promote such practices or improve on the terms and conditions.  Following this 
definition, in our screening procedure, we explicitly exclude: 
 Contractual arrangements that have no service-providing clauses; for example, forward sales 
and price hedging, which are too-common practices. ‘Contract farming’ as usually referred to 
by FAO, UNCTAD and World Bank, and as defined by this review, implies that there needs to 
be some services for technological upgrading of production (Lindholm, 2014).  
 Studies on contractual arrangements that only concern marketing (e.g., collective marketing, 
marketing boards, preferred suppliers, etc.), except when accompanied by pre-harvest 
service delivery from the procuring firm directly to the contracted smallholders.  
 Traditional sharecropping arrangements in which a smallholder works his land on a 
sharecropping basis with a farmer who provides the necessary inputs in exchange for a part 
of the harvest. They will be included only if a firm is involved, and the contract is offered to 
multiple farmers under the same conditions. 
 Product certification schemes (e.g., Utz, Fair Trade, Rainforest Alliance) that do not have a 
non–transferable fixed term forward sale contract with a specific firm; these studies are 
covered by a separate systematic review that is ongoing (Oya, 2015) 
 Hybrid situations, such as a contract between a cooperative and a fixed buyer, and 
subsequent services delivery of these organisations to the members will only be included if 
the decision to enter in such a contractual arrangement with the firm is optional for individual 
farmers/members. This excludes most instances of Fair Trade exports, in which it is the 
cooperative that sells to a firm, not the individual farmer.  
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 Contractual arrangements that are not within the realm of ‘agriculture’, such as forest 
exploitation and marine fishery. 
 
Types of Comparisons  
Contract farming is not a single homogenous intervention but more accurately conceptualised as a 
package of various services provided to a farmer in exchange for a pre-planting sales agreement with 
a buyer: higher or more stable prices, a guaranteed market, inputs or financing on credit, agricultural 
extension, access to improved inputs, certification, and transport. If the contract contains such 
benefits, it needs to be clear which of these services are also available to the comparison group not 
having a pre-planting sales agreement. The actual interventions considered in the synthesis will be the 
differences in service packages made available to farmers in exchange for the pre-planting sales 
agreements with the buyers.  
Comparison-group farmers will usually be located in the same region as intervention farmers. In 
instances with no geographical separation between intervention and control groups, studies should 
usually have an analytical design that enables control for spill-over effects, or they will be down-
graded according to risk of bias criteria.  
The treatment and comparison groups in the studies need to be similar, and to include at least a 
subgroup of smallholder farmers. Where necessary, the meta-analysis will consider effects on 
smallholders only, using a disaggregated analysis of the effects on this subgroup.  
Types of Outcomes  
The meta-analysis of studies of effects will focus on the intermediate and ultimate outcomes of the 
contractual arrangements (see Chapter 1 on the Theory of Change). We anticipate a wide diversity of 
proxy-indicators (e.g., survey questions) used by different authors to measure similar outcome areas 
of contracts. We will focus on the agricultural practices, yields and/or net returns derived from 
producing the contracted crop. These intermediate outcomes are the most important justification for 
farmers to enter into a contract farming arrangement.  
As ultimate outcomes, we will focus on households income, market power and food security. We list 
the proxy-indicators used in each study to register changes in these outcome areas. Income may be 
measured directly (income, expenditure) or indirectly (poverty, asset, or income indicators). Food 
security may also be measured by a wide range of indicators (Heady and Ecker, 2013; Bellemare and 
Novak, 2015). Potential intra-household heterogeneity of effects will be taken into account. These 
ultimate outcomes are the most important justification for the policies and investments that aim to 
facilitate and promote contract farming for poverty reduction. 
Contracts may also have unintended outcomes; outcomes that change because of the contractual 
arrangement but that were not the reason for starting the arrangement in the first place. Unintended 
outcomes include both positive and negative impacts. Positive unintended outcomes are spill-over 
effects to non-participating farmers, either through transfer of knowledge or employment generation, 
or unintended outcomes in the household as a result of the contractual arrangement, such as 
educational opportunities, health care, or increased visibility by and access to other development 
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support. Potential negative unintended outcomes include financial risk exposure (indebtedness), 
health (agrochemicals), reduced on-farm biodiversity (mono-cropping). Positive or negative changes 
to intra-household gender relations may also occur.  
Study designs 
Most studies evaluating the impact of contract farming on smallholder producers analyse a single 
contractual arrangement (case study). Such evaluation studies may assess whether or not a specific 
arrangement was successful. However, because of the case study context, they are limited in their 
ability to make inferences about the effectiveness of various specifications of the contractual 
arrangement and to point to combination of factors that may be conducive in different contexts. We 
expect to make a comparative study of empirical instances of contract farming for which good-quality 
effectiveness studies have been done. In the review, we hope to identify, through a case-based 
comparative analysis, several contextual factors and contract characteristics that seem to be key 
ingredients for an enabling institutional and policy environment that could make contract farming 
more effective for smallholders, for example, third-party verification (Saenger et al., 2013).   
In the initial title-abstract screening, no studies will be excluded based on the type of study, as the 
review contains both a meta-analysis and reflection on the impact pathways and enablers and barriers 
to effectiveness through a case-based comparative analysis. However, the study type and research 
design will be a main criterion when selecting the quantitative effectiveness studies for meta-analysis 
(research question 1). The studies selected for meta-analysis also will define the empirical instances 
for which the enablers and barriers of effectiveness will be compared (research question 2). 
Quantitative effectiveness studies 
Contract farming is usually initiated by a private company that locates its operations in an area where 
the product that it wants to buy is widely grown or where agro-ecological conditions are well suited 
for growing the product of interest. It is common practice for the company to select only those farmers 
which it believes can offer the right quality at the right price. Large farms in easy-to-reach locations 
are more likely to be selected. Often, criteria used by firms to select farmers are a combination of 
observable and non-observable characteristics (Bellemare, 2012). Farmers who are offered a contract 
can decide whether or not to take it. Those farmers who expect to benefit most from the contract are 
most likely to accept the offer. Because this decision is at least partly based on unobservable 
characteristics such as ability, dedication, or knowledge, a self-selection problem is created which 
might cause bias. Therefore, quantitative effectiveness studies selected for meta-analysis will need to 
have a design that controls for this selection bias when computing effect estimates. This will include 
both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. Following the standard guidelines of systematic review 
bodies such as the Cochrane and Campbell Collaboration (Higgins and Green, 2011), a hierarchy in 
methodological rigour in effectiveness studies is applied using the decision tree  developed by 
Waddington et al. (2012).  
Some studies use Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) for testing the effectiveness of certain contract 
components, such as third-party verification (Saenger et al., 2013). However, most studies are 
expected to have a quasi-experimental design. We include studies using statistical matching (e.g., 
propensity score matching or PSM, or covariate matching), regression adjustment (e.g., difference-in-
differences or DID, and single difference regression analysis, instrumental variables or IV, estimation 
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and Heckman selection models), as well as other cross-sectional or longitudinal designs which used 
less rigorous approaches. Given the breadth of designs included, the risk of bias will be assessed using 
the 3ie’s Risk of Bias tool [see chapter 3.5 (Hombrados and Waddington, 2012)].  
Qualitative descriptive studies 
The quantitative studies alone are expected to give only some of the information needed to identify 
enablers and barriers for effectiveness in each empirical instance. Therefore, around each example of 
contract farming (the same instances covered by the studies selected for the meta-analysis), we will 
search for complementary evidence and background information (see paragraph 3.3). A wide range 
of documents will be closely examined for potential contribution to this analysis: policy documents, 
business plans, websites, project initiation documents, etc. This literature will be used not only to 
reflect in more depth on the relevant barriers and enablers of effectiveness mentioned in each of the 
effectiveness studies, but also to identify other influencing factors that were not reported yet deemed 
relevant. Where important information gaps remain, the authors of the selected studies or 
implementers of the contract farming arrangement may be contacted. 
Since the inclusion criteria are potentially large, and this part of the study will include both descriptive 
information (e.g. programme design and monitoring documents) and analytical literature (e.g. process 
evaluation documents) we will report transparently the types of evidence obtained for these different 
types of information. The studies used to make inferences on barriers and enablers will be assessed 
on relevance and rigor – whether the method used to generate the particular data is credible and 
trustworthy (Wong et al., 2013) - using the checklist described in paragraph 3.5. 
 
Other Inclusion/ Exclusion Criteria  
The search strategy will include electronic data-bases that provide access to non-English literature 
using English search terms (e.g., www.worldwidescience.org). The research team has a good 
command of written Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, German and Dutch, which will be used to 
identify unpublished studies through complementary web-searching. If the language of a study proves 
to be a problem for data extraction (e.g., Japanese, Chinese), this will be mentioned in the review 
report.  
 
3.2 Methods Used in Primary Research  
To be selected, primary research in quantitative effectiveness studies requires a research design that 
documents the outcomes of a real functioning contractual arrangement (not the expected/simulated 
outcomes in newly designed/planned contractual arrangements). Studies of effects need a 
counterfactual design to critically check the key assumption that these outcomes would not have 
occurred without the contract farming arrangement. During the process of developing the review, no 
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study using Randomised Control Trial (RCT) has been identified. Studies that are likely to be included 
use quasi-experimental designs. 
A good example of a study that will be included in the meta-analysis is Miyata et al. (2007), who 
studied the impact of contracts on growers of apples and green onions in China by comparing contract 
with non-contract growers. Contract farmers in their sample were selected randomly from lists 
provided by four private firms; non-contract farmers were selected randomly from lists provided by 
village leaders. A Heckman model was used to control for sample selection bias, with distance to the 
village leader as an identifying variable. This identifier was used because village leaders are often 
involved in selecting farmers for contract schemes.  
 
3.3 Search Methods for Identification of Studies  
Search Terms 
To find relevant qualitative and quantitative research, we will use a comprehensive search strategy. 
The retrieved studies will then be screened to identify the core set of studies that give evidence on 
quantitative effectiveness, used to respond to research question 1, to define the empirical instances 
of contract farming for meta-analysis. A wider pool of studies will be used for responding to research 
question 2, to identify relevant information for reflecting on the impact pathways, causal mechanisms, 
contextual conditions and outcomes of contract farming in these empirical instances. The search 
strategy detailed in this paragraph concerns the first search process to answer research question 1 
and select the empirical instances of contract farming. See Annex 3 for the detailed search strategy 
used on SCOPUS and CAB-Abstracts. 
Electronic Searches 
During the preparation of this review protocol, in October 2014, we searched the academic literature 
through Scopus.com based on provisional research terms. We used the results to fine-tune the search 
strategy. A more comprehensive electronic search was applied to Scopus and CAB Abstracts in March 
2015, with a modified search strategy, following the suggestions of the information retrieval specialist 
in 3ie, John Eyers. We updated these electronic searches in Scopus.com and CAB Abstracts, in October 
2015. In this electronic search we will use all of the following electronic libraries: 
 Scopus.com 
 CAB Abstracts 
 Web of Science 
 Agricola 
 Econlit 
 Tropag & Rural (Royal Tropical Inst, Amsterdam) 
 
 
Other Searches 
In addition to the electronic search, hand-searching and snowballing should add more studies to the 
review.  Additional literature will be searched according to the following four-step process: 
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Step 1. Non-academic data-bases 
First, we will search for complementary academic and non-academic literature in several databases, 
where electronic search results are impossible or cannot be exported in a useable format. Databases 
of organisations such as FAO, World Bank and IFAD are searched for grey literature which is not 
available through the bibliographic databases searched. The list of websites and library locations is 
still not final but will include at least the following: 
• Agris, the FAO database on agricultural science and technology information 
• Agecon, research in agricultural and applied research 
• Worldscienceweb.org (federation of national science portals where  research results are 
made available by participating nations, providing detailed coverage of global science and 
research results across language barriers.) 
• Eldis (collection of editorially selected and abstracted full-text, online documents on 
development issues), IDS 
• IDEAS (bibliographic database dedicated to Economics and economic research, including 
Research Papers in Economics database (RePEc ) 
• Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations 
• ProQuest dissertation database 
• Best Evidence Encyclopaedia (BEE) 
• ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) 
• USAID 
• IFPRI 
• R4D, DFID 
• Jolis: World bank and IMF database, http://external.worldbankimflib.org 
• 3ie Database of Impact Assessment, covering impact evaluations conducted in low and 
middle- income countries, http://www.3ieimpact.org/database_of_impact_ 
evaluations.html 
• Google scholar: general search, the hits will be screened with regard to their potential 
relevance to the present systematic review. 
• Researchgate, https://www.researchgate.net 
• SSRN, Social Science Research Network, which includes working papers and submitted 
papers under review 
• FAO Contract Farming Centre. http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/contract-farming/index-cf/en/ 
• CIAT & CGIAR 
• Regoverning Markets, http://www.iied.org/regoverning-markets 
 
Step 2. Snowballing books and review articles 
Second, we will use snowballing of references in review articles and books. For example, Oya (2012) 
provides an extensive overview of the literature on contract farming in Africa focusing on on-going 
ideological debates and drivers of change. Minot and Ronchi also identified several effectiveness 
studies (Minot and Ronchi, 2015) and several new volumes have been published that give an overview 
of research on contract farming (da Silva and Shepherd, 2013; Da Silva and Ranking, 2013). Prowse 
(2012) analysed 100 studies, mostly grey literature from the FAO database.  
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Step 3. Citation tracking 
Third, citations to the studies used in the meta-analysis will be identified through citation searches 
(Google Scholar, Scopus, Web of Science)  and, if not yet included, screened on the inclusion/ exclusion 
criteria. Subsequently, the references of all newly included studies will be screened for other relevant 
studies, using snowballing of references and forward citation tracking. 
Step 4. Practitioners’ networks 
Fourth, the link and information on our dedicated website associated with this systematic review 
(http://contractfarming-systematicreview.wikispaces.com/) will be circulated among the following 
communities of practice and e-discussion groups: 
 The Knowledge Brokers’ Forum (http://www.knowledgebrokersforum.org/);  
 Platform on African and European Partnerships in Agricultural Research for Development 
(http://paepard.blogspot.com/);  
 Global Conference on Agricultural and Rural Development-Africa 
(http://gcardblog.wordpress.com/tag/africa/);  
 Global Forum on Rural Advisory Services (http://www.g-fras.org/en/);  
 FAO portal on contract farming Contract Farming Resource Centre 
http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/contract-farming/index-cf/en/ 
 INNOVAGRO (http://www.redinnovagro.in/) 
 
Step 5. Searching around each empirical instance 
Fifth, to answer research question 2, we aim to retrieve additional material that refers to the same 
contractual arrangement and context which are the focus of the studies selected for meta-analysis. 
This will allow us to complement the information on context characteristics and contract modalities 
needed to reflect on the enablers and barriers in the empirical instances of contract farming covered 
by the studies selected for the meta-analysis. There will be four separate searches around each 
empirical instance: with the authors name, the name of the contract farming arrangement, the name 
of contracting firm, and the geographical location of the empirical instance. Next to the data-bases 
mentioned above in Step 1, we will use Google, www.google.com and LexisNexis Academic 
http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/.  The retrieved documents will be checked for other useful references. 
 
Reference Management and Screening Procedures 
The search results used to identify a broad set of potentially relevant qualitative and quantitative 
empirical studies as well as conceptual papers on contract farming are stored in EPPI Reviewer 4. Each 
upload will indicate the source and search terms used, by uploading search specific RIS-files).  
In the title-abstract screening, reviewers will be over-inclusive, and include all studies that are related 
to agriculture and in which transactions in product or input markets are mentioned. At least 50% of 
these references are double-coded. In the full-text screening, all references will be reviewed by at 
least two reviewers. Two lead reviewers will then independently assess full-text studies for inclusion 
in the meta-analysis. The lead researcher will reconcile and make a verdict on the final coding.  
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Data extraction of all studies included in the meta-analysis will be done by two of the lead researchers. 
Possible disagreements will be arbitrated by a third reviewer. 
Title-abstract screening 
In the title and abstract screening, studies are excluded if these do not concern or do not comply with 
one or more of the following six exclusion criteria, mentioned in paragraph 3.1: 
1. EXCLUDED no agricultural value chain 
2. EXCLUDED forestry (timber, wood) 
3. EXCLUDED marine fishery (sea, coastal) 
4. EXCLUDED not in low/middle income country 
5. EXCLUDED no market related contractual arrangement 
6. EXCLUDED not considering farmers 
7. EXCLUDED FOR META-ANALYSIS: relevant but no empirical instance 
 INCLUDED (might) include empirical instance 
 
Full text screening 
After title-abstract screening, we will have a set of publications for which we can retrieve the full text. 
The references are screened on the above mentioned exclusion criteria about relevance, and using 
three additional criteria related with our definition of the intervention, contract farming.   
Some studies do not assess effectiveness but, for example, differences in characteristics of farmers 
with and without contracts, or explore differences in performance between contracting farmers. We 
will use two additional exclusion criteria to further focus on the subset of studies potentially useful for 
meta-analysis: 
8. EXCLUDED no study on impact/ effectiveness 
9. EXCLUDED no pre-harvest service delivery 
 
All studies that result from this full-text screening will contain information about one or more 
empirical instances of contract farming.  
 
Selection for meta-analysis 
The studies that remain included will be differentiated based on the methodological rigour of the 
assessment of their impact. 
Data will need to be collected at farm or household level in both intervention and comparison groups. 
Observational studies are included whenever they control for unobservable characteristics using 
statistical matching (propensity score or covariate matching) or regression adjustment (difference-in-
differences, single difference regression analysis, instrumental variables estimation, and Heckman 
selection models). Both study designs that collect longitudinal data at baseline and end-line, and those 
that use cross-sectional end-line data only, are included.  
10. EXCLUDED empirical studies without comparison group or other counterfactual design 
 INCLUDED empirical studies with comparison group or other counterfactual design 
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The studies that do not have a counterfactual design will be excluded from meta-analysis. However, a 
portion of these studies may be retrieved during synthesis if they relate to one or more of the selected 
empirical instances of contract farming. This non-counterfactual literature may give additional insights 
in processes or mechanisms related to contract farming, and help to answer our second research 
question.  
 
3.4 Data Collection and Management 
All studies will be entered in the specialist systematic review software – EPPI Reviewer 4 (Thomas et 
al., 2010). EPPI-Reviewer 4 has been developed and maintained by the EPPI-Centre at the Social 
Science Research Unit at the Institute of Education, University College London, UK. EPPI-Reviewer is 
used to screen the studies, to define the empirical instances, to archive the studies used in the 
qualtitative an qualitative analysis, and for the assessment of study quality and risk of bias.  
The meta-analysis will be done by using packages available in Stata. Metan is the main Stata meta-
analysis command. Its latest version allows the user to input the cell frequencies from the 2 × 2 table 
for each study (for binary outcomes), the mean and standard deviation in each group (for numerical 
outcomes), or the effect estimate and standard error from each study. It provides a comprehensive 
range of methods for meta-analysis, including inverse-variance–weighted meta-analysis, and creates 
new variables containing the treatment effect estimate and its standard error for each study. These 
variables can then be used as inputs into a wide range of other Stata meta-analysis commands (Harris 
et al., 2010). 
The detailed analysis of the qualitative literature around the enablers and barriers in each of the 
empirical instances will use ATLAS.TI to prepare for qualitative data analysis. ATLAS.TI is more versatile 
than EPPI Reviewer 4, when coding and synthesising diverse types of evidence to find conditions, 
drivers, enablers and barriers to effectiveness.  
 
3.5 Critical appraisal and Risk of Bias assessment 
The IDCG risk of bias tool (Hombrados and Waddington, 2012)  will be used for critical appraisal. As 
most studies will not have random assignment of the treatment, we will pay particular attention to 
evaluating the quality of the alternative mechanism for obtaining group equivalence. When propensity 
score matching (PSM) or Heckman selection equations are used, these should at the very least 
consider farm size. If relevant for the value chain studied, other farm characteristics determining 
participation, such as the presence of irrigation equipment, are also required. Distance to roads or 
distance to town centre are potentially important additional variables. The relevance of any other 
instruments will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
The eight steps in the IDCG risk of bias tool are a critical examination of: 
1. Mechanism of assignment 
2. Group equivalence 
3. Hawthorne and John Henry effects 
4. Spill-overs 
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5. Selective outcome reporting 
6. Selective analysis reporting 
7. Other bias 
8. Confidence intervals 
 
The risk of bias assessment on the quantitative effectiveness studies will be visualised as in 
Waddington et al. (2014), in Appendix F of the systematic review of Farmer Field Schools, which 
summarized five (instead of eight) areas where bias may be present. 
Figure 5. Risk of bias assessment graph 
 
Source: (Waddington et al., 2014) 
 
Critical Appraisal of Qualitative Studies 
Subsequently, we will collect additional information on each empirical instance of contract farming 
covered in the studies selected for meta-analysis, on enablers and barriers in each empirical instance. 
We will critically appraise the studies and information sources used to complement the information 
provided in the quantitative effectiveness studies on the context, enablers and barriers to 
effectiveness in each of the empirical instances. We will present a table with an assessment of the 
study quality for all complementary information used in the synthesis to answer the research 
questions, using the critical appraisal tool used in the Farmer Field School review (Waddington et al., 
2014). This tool reviews the presence of sixteen quality attibutes in qualitative studies (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Critical appraisal tool used in the Farmer Field School review 
 
Source: (Waddington et al., 2014) 
 
3.6 Measures of Treatment Effect 
The effectiveness studies are expected to measure impact in various ways, with different methods of 
data-collection and proxy-indicators for different outcome areas. Studies using similar outcome areas 
will be grouped together in the meta-analysis.  
To compare different outcomes measured on a continuous scale, the outcome measure will be 
converted into standardized mean differences (d), indicating the effect-size in standard deviations 
between treatment and the control group (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). 
We will use various formulae to calculate SMD. Where information is available, we will use the 
outcome means in intervention (X1) and comparison groups (X2), together with the pooled standard 
deviation (spooled), estimated as the weighted average of the standard deviations in intervention group 
(s1) and comparison group (s2).   
 
For studies reporting the result of a t-test between control and treatment group, standardized mean 
differences will be estimated as: 
𝑑 = 𝑡 √
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝑛1𝑛2
 
In the unlikely case that only total sample size is reported, it will be assumed that the number of 
participants is the same in control and treatment group (𝑛1 = 𝑛2). 
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For studies reporting partial effect sizes - effect sizes reported as regression coefficients from 
regressions that adjust for other covariates - the beta-coefficient (β) will be used instead of the mean 
differences (X1-X2) in de formula for standardised mean differences (d). 
To correct for the fact that some studies have small sample sizes, the standardised effect size for all 
included studies will be converted into the adjusted mean difference (d’) using the following formula: 
 
 
 
Standard deviations of standardized mean differences will be calculated using one of the following 
formulae: 
 
When the outcome variable is not measured on a continuous scale but on a dichotomous scale, the 
odds-ratio will be used to compare effects. Odds ratios (OR) and corresponding standard errors will 
be calculated as follows:  
OR = 
𝑠𝑡∗(𝑛𝑐−𝑠𝑐)
𝑠𝑐∗(𝑛𝑡−𝑠𝑡)
 
𝑆𝐸
𝑂𝑅=√
1
𝑠𝑐
+
1
𝑠𝑡
+
1
𝑛𝑐−𝑠𝑐
+
1
𝑛𝑡−𝑠𝑡
 
where s refers to the number of successful cases in treatment (t) and control group (c) and n to the 
sizes of the treatment and control group.  
Odds ratios may be converted to standardised mean differences using the method suggested by 
Hasselblad and Hedges (1995):  
𝑑 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑅) ×
√3
𝜋
 
𝑆𝐸𝑑 = √𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑅) ×
3
𝜋2
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Conversely, standardised mean differences may be converted to odds ratios using 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑅) = 𝑑
𝜋
√3
 
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑅) = √𝑉𝑑
𝜋2
3
 
To derive these estimates, information from some studies may be lacking. We will make use  of the 
effect-size calculator (http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/resources/effect_size_input.php). The 
estimates will be based on the statistical information provided in the studies, or, when missing, on the 
information provided by the study authors as requested by the review team. 
To facilitate interpretation of findings, the estimated pooled standardised effect size could be 
converted back into the pooled absolute effect size, for example using the approach suggested by 
Rosenthal and Rubin (1982) who suggest conversion into percentage difference in improvement rate 
between treatment and control group. This could take the form of a table which converts the pooled 
standardised effect sizes into values of the outcome variable. In order to do so, assumptions are 
required regarding baseline values and standard deviations. These assumptions will always be clearly 
stated, either directly in the table or in the accompanying text. 
 
3.7 Unit of Analysis Issues 
The unit of analysis is smallholder farmers in low and middle income countries. We will use the 
classification used by the World Bank (2014).  
In agricultural surveys, the selection of the sample often follows a clustered design. For clustered 
designs, the assessment of the unit of analysis error will be based on whether the unit of analysis is 
different from the unit of treatment assignment. If this is the case, the review will assess whether 
study authors take clustering into account in the analysis (e.g., using multilevel model, variance 
components analysis or cluster level fixed effects). For those studies with relevant risk of unit of 
analysis error, corrections will be applied to the standard errors and confidence intervals of those 
studies. Adjusted standard errors for those studies with relevant risk of unit of analysis error can be 
estimated as follows (Higgins & Green, 2011): 
SEcorrected = SEuncorrected ∗ √(1 + (m − 1) ∗ ICC 
Where m is the number of observations per cluster and ICC is the intra-cluster correlation coefficient. 
The ICC is an estimate of the relative variability within and between clusters. The higher it is, the larger 
the dependence between the observations within clusters and smaller the effective sample size. 
 
3.8 Criteria for Determining Independent Findings  
Most likely, the primary studies used for meta-analysis will provide data on multiple outcome 
measures, including different proxy-indicators for intermediate and ultimate outcomes. This not a 
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problem if a study measures outcomes in these different areas and the outcome area can be analysed 
separately across studies. However, in many cases, multiple proxy-indicators may refer to the same 
outcome area. In such cases, these outcome measures are taken on the same sample of participants 
and, therefore, are not independent estimates in the computation of pooled effects because the same 
study is used multiple times in the same meta-analysis. An explanation of the criteria used to 
determine whether multiple outcomes from the same or related evaluations are independent data 
points will be carefully spelled out. We prefer separate stratified analyses, using the proxy-indicator 
with the lowest risk of bias in the attribution of impact. However, in some cases we may combine 
groups prior to synthesis, by calculating a ‘synthetic’ sample-weighted average effect size of the proxy-
outcomes that relate to the same outcome area, using appropriate formulae to recalculate variances 
and standard errors, making covariance assumptions as necessary (Borenstein et al., 2011). 
3.9 Dealing with Missing Data  
Where data is missing for the meta-analysis of effects of contract farming in the selected empirical 
instances, authors or implementing agencies will be contacted by e-mail. If key information remains 
missing, studies will not be included in (all) sub-analyses, but the studies will still be described in the 
overall analysis.  
For the case-based comparative analysis, with the same empirical instances as focal points, the review 
will extract the relevant available information in the effectiveness studies (see Coding tool), but 
complement this with other pieces of information about the empirical instance of contract farming 
retrieved in the complementary targeted search process or received from authors of studies or the 
implementing agencies. For each empirical instance, we will indicate areas for which information 
remains incomplete and how this may threaten the validity of the inferences made in the review 
(Shadish et al., 2002). 
3.10 Quantitative Synthesis of Effects 
This part of the study is geared to making a map of the available evidence for each step in the result 
chain, the rigour of the research methods used, and the size of effects that are reported, grouping 
contractual arrangements that are approximately similar. 
Once we have selected the empirical studies which give a quantitative estimate of the size of the 
effects of contract farming, data will be grouped according to the relevant immediate, intermediate 
and ultimate outcome area. We will present the standardised effect in each study on each outcome 
area in forest plots, and in a narrative synthesis we describe the type of outcome and the 
heterogeneity of the findings. Effectiveness studies of approximately similar contract farming 
arrangements and similar outcome indicators, likely a small number of studies, will be analysed with 
pooled effect estimates.  
Data Synthesis  
Quantitative estimates of effectiveness (effect sizes) in each of the studies will be presented using 
forest plots and, where possible, synthesised using inverse-variance weighted meta-analysis, using the 
metan package in Stata 13. If meta-analysis is not possible, effect sizes will be presented in forest plots 
without the pooled effect estimate, and a narrative synthesis will be provided describing the 
heterogeneity in the findings. We will use the random effects model, acknowledging that the 
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treatment is not uniform and with context-specific effect-sizes. Random effects meta-analysis 
assumes that there is some true variation between the included studies, besides random variation due 
to sampling. The model provides estimates of these two components of variance which can guide 
further exploration of heterogeneity. 
Assessment of Heterogeneity  
The presence of heterogeneity will be visually examined by making forest plots of the pooled results 
and formally tested using the chi-squared test. Given the small number of included studies, the level 
of significance at which we consider heterogeneity to be present will be set at 0.1, to account for the 
low power of the test with small samples.  
Furthermore, heterogeneity will be assessed with the I-squared statistic, which measures the 
percentage of variability that is due to real variability between studies. Values close to 100% indicate 
a large real variability, values close to zero indicate no observable real variability. Final evaluation of 
test results depend on the significance of the chi-squared test described above and the sign and size 
of standardised effect sizes.  
As we will be using a random effects model for the meta-analysis, between-study heterogeneity can 
also be assessed with the tau-squared statistic.  
Based on our preparatory screening results and discussions with the Advisory Board in February 2015 
(Annex 1), we expect that contextual heterogeneity may be an issue that prevents pooled statistics. 
The most likely causes of this heterogeneity result from the type of product (e.g., perishable and non-
perishable products, annual and perennial crops, and intensive animal husbandry) and type of markets 
(local spot market, processing, local high-value market, export, etc.). The prevalence of heterogeneity 
depends in part on which products and markets are covered by the identified studies. Also, in the likely 
absence of a ‘standard contract’, the heterogeneity of contract clauses and conditions could 
complicate the drawing of valid inferences regarding the effect size.  
To assess the comparability of contractual arrangements between the empirical instances included in 
the quantitative effectiveness studies, differences in content and conditions will be mapped using the 
coding tool (see Figure 2 and Annex 3). The extent to which this mapping derives in an adequate 
control of heterogeneity cannot be answered at protocol stage, and crucially depends on data (study) 
availability. Based on the number of studies already identified, we expect that the treatment ‘contract 
farming arrangement’ might be similar enough to permit generalised inferences based on pooled 
statistics only for a limited set of studies, probably the studies that relate to annual crops.  Where it is 
not possible to pool information using statistical meta-analysis, we will describe findings narratively 
and use a theoretical framework of synthesis (e.g. analysis of outcomes along the causal chain). We 
will also aim to present effect sizes using forest plots.  
The case-based comparative analysis will focus on research question 2, and use the studies covered in 
the meta-analysis. In the case-based comparative analysis we will explore in detail the content and 
heterogeneity of the contractual arrangements (dispute resolution clauses, payment systems, 
embedded services, etc.) which are mentioned in the study as enabling conditions that influence the 
performance of contract farming (enablers, barriers).  
 26 
Investigation of Heterogeneity  
For inclusion in meta-analysis, and especially when pooled statistics are used, the review will ensure 
that included studies are similar enough that it makes sense to combine them, sensibly divide the 
included studies into homogeneous groups, or conclude that it did not make sense to combine or 
group the included studies. Random effects meta-analysis will be employed on each sub-set of studies 
that are ‘approximately comparable’, based on our groupings of interventions, exposures and 
outcomes, drawing on information obtained from the quantitative and qualitative studies. We will 
code the studies in such a way that these codes can be used as moderator variables in sub-group meta-
analysis or meta-regression. We will detail why studies are considered to be sufficiently comparable 
to permit pooled statistics or not. 
Heterogeneity is also relevant in the qualitative synthesis, in which we combine the quantitative 
effectiveness studies with complementary qualitative information on the same empirical instance of 
contract farming, to answer research question 2 about enablers and barriers for effectiveness of 
contract farming. We will assess the research quality that underpinned the findings in these pieces of 
information. We will follow as much as possible the critical appraisal tool used in the Farmer Field 
School review (Waddington et al., 2014). The confidence in each aspect will be judged as high, 
moderate, low, or very low. This assessment will be described and justified in a summary table of all 
pieces of qualitative information used.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
Whenever we compute effect sizes with pooled statistics, a sensitivity analysis will be performed to 
check the robustness of these findings. Therefore, any overall pooled results will be compared to 
pooled-results of sub-sets of studies. For example, one of the sub-set analyses will be based on the 
study design and methodology used in the included studies. Studies will also be grouped according to 
their overall risk of bias scores and compared. We also expect to compare studies based on the period 
over which they measure the impact, i.e., group studies based on the number of years farmers have 
been receiving the contract farming arrangement at the moment of measurement. During the review 
process, other relevant comparisons are likely to be found, and will be included in the sensitivity 
analyses. 
Assessment of Reporting Bias  
We will analyse the quantitative effectiveness studies using funnel plots to visually explore publication 
bias. In addition, we will report Egger’s meta-regression test (Egger et al., 1997) when there are 
sufficient studies to be able to do so, using the Stata metabias command. 
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Figure 7. Conceptual framework use to code the information to answer research question 2 on barriers and enablers. 
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3.11 Case-based Comparative Analysis of Enabling Conditions 
This second research question concerns conditions that work as enablers or barriers for the positive 
effects to materialize. It consists of two sub-questions: 2.1 What are the enabling and disabling 
conditions that explain the effectiveness and sustainability of the contract farming arrangements for 
smallholder famers?, and 2.2 Are there configurations of conditions that may predict success or failure 
of contract farming arrangements? We anticipate that the quantitative studies alone are unlikely to 
provide all information needed to assess the presence or absence and relevance or irrelevance of 
these conditions. Therefore, we will complement the impact studies with qualitative studies and other 
pieces of information that may shed light on the conditions that are relevant in the context of each 
empirical instance. The studies selected for the quantitative studies (meta-analysis) will define the 
specific instances of contract farming that will be covered in this qualitative analysis, i.e., the specific 
places and situations described in these studies. For each of these instances, complementary literature 
will be identified using a combination of snowballing and targeted searches. Internet searches will be 
used to identify pieces of information that can inform us about the particular conditions and dynamics 
in each empirical instance, especially when not reported with sufficient detail in the effectiveness 
studies (see step 5 in Chapter 3.3). 
In Figure 7, we identify three sets of enablers and barriers.  
 
 geographical conditions (climate, soil type, access to water, access to markets),  
 political/ economic issues (land rights, market competition, market regulations, history of 
economic shocks), and  
 characteristics of the business environment (stakeholder partnerships, business support 
services, financial services, third party quality verification systems, reliable legal system). 
 
We will check the relevance of these enabling conditions for each empirical instance of contract 
farming. This mapping will be used to draw generalised inferences about enablers and barriers to the 
successful implementation of contract farming with smallholders. In doing so, we use the evidence to 
build more refined impact pathways than the one depicted in Figure 2,. The resulting typology and 
related refined impact pathways will be discussed with members of the advisory board, to check its 
face validity, before being presented in the review report. 
If deemed necessary - in consultation with the Advisory Board and 3ie - this part of the systematic 
review may have a more limited focus and concentrate on the subset of contractual arrangements for 
which findings about enabling conditions have fewer threats to external validity. For example, focusing 
especially on the empirical instances of contract farming identified in the meta-analysis that relate to 
a key moderating variable that is common to a subset of studies, e.g., related to annual agricultural 
crops (see Annex 1 – Minutes of the Advisory Board meeting – February 2015).   
 
3.12 Validity Threats to the Results  
We anticipate that we will not be able to draw strong conclusions on the effectiveness of contract 
farming because of the expected wide heterogeneity of contractual arrangements, contexts, limited 
number of replications of studies that refer to the same empirical instance, and the quality of the 
study designs. The results of the review will be more explorative in nature and will suggest areas to be 
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explored in subsequent empirical research on the effectiveness of contract farming for smallholder 
income and food security.  
4. Plans for Updating the Review 
Funding permitting, the review will be updated within three years, based on an electronic search for 
new academic studies, complemented with a focused search in the institutes and data-bases 
mentioned in review. The newly retrieved quantitative effectiveness studies will be assessed using the 
same coding tool as in this review.  
5. Time frame 
Searches for published and unpublished studies   09/2014—11/2015 
Screening/ relevance assessments   10/2014—12/2015 
Pilot testing of study codes and data collection 10/2015—11/2015 
Extraction of data from research reports 12/2015—02/2016 
Statistical synthesis  11/2015—12/2015 
Qualitative synthesis (if appropriate) 12/2015—03/2016 
Preparation of report  03/2015—04/2015 
Report revisions 05/2015—10/2016 
Presentation of findings/ policy influence work  10/2016—12/2016 
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7. The Review Team and Contributions of Authors 
We have opted for a small core team, consisting of Giel Ton from LEI Wageningen UR and Wytse 
Vellema, Sam Desiere and Marijke D'Haese from Ghent University, to make internal coordination as 
effective as possible. The proximity of Wageningen and Ghent allows team members and students to 
have regular face-to-face meetings, making it easier to maintain internal consistency. All core team 
members are specialised in research on smallholder farmers in developing countries. Searching will 
be done with the help of a senior librarian at LEI Wageningen UR. Easily definable tasks, such as title-
abstract screening and full-text mapping, will be delegated to several graduate students and interns, 
including Sophia Weituschat, although they will always be double coded in EPPI Reviewer by one of 
the lead researchers.  
Giel Ton  
Giel Ton works as Senior Researcher at LEI Wageningen UR, The Netherlands, and has ample 
experience in managing project teams, especially to align methodologies and approaches between 
different research paradigms (Ton, 2012). He has been involved in the design and monitoring of 
several contractual arrangements in agriculture, especially related to product certification, such as 
Fair Trade, Utz Certified and Rainforest Alliance (Waarts et al., 2012), and research on internal 
organizational management of contract farming (Ton and Mheen-Sluijer, 2009) and collective 
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marketing (Ton et al., 2014a). In this context, he has experience in developing impact logic frameworks 
to evaluate interventions. He has been involved in two systematic literature reviews that have been 
published (Ton et al., 2013). He also participated in the online ‘Elluminate course for review teams’ by 
EPPI-Centre in 2011 and the Induction Course by 3ie in November 2014. One review concerned the 
impact of innovation grants that are directed to smallholder farmers (Ton et al., 2013; Ton et al., 2015). 
A second systematic review was commissioned by the Dutch Evaluation Office (IOB) and explored 
evidence on the effectiveness of policies to enhance Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Giel Ton 
participated in the design of the research (protocol), especially in the refinement of conceptual 
framework and intervention logic to map the literature in a more homogenous typology (Ingram et 
al., 2012). Giel Ton will lead the development of the review methodologies and do the qualitative 
synthesis. He has experience with Atlas.ti  for qualitative data synthesis from his PhD-study on the 
impact of small-grant funds on economic farmer organisation.  
Wytse Vellema  
Wytse obtained his PhD at the department of agricultural economics at Ghent University, Belgium. His 
research focuses on how different type of sourcing arrangements affect the inclusion and well-being 
of smallholder farmers. He is lead researcher on the impact evaluation team for a development 
intervention by CRS. The project aims to improve the livelihoods, income, and food security of 
smallholder coffee farmers in the Southern Colombian Andes and the Ecuadorian Amazon through 
improved market access and increased on-farm diversification. In the context of this assignment, he 
has gained experience with developing impact logic frameworks and measurement tools for 
monitoring and evaluation. He has a background in international economics and business, specialising 
in econometrics. During one year at Cambridge University he further developed his theoretical and 
quantitative skills. After a short detour in mergers and acquisitions as a valuations specialist, he 
finished a research master’s degree in rural development. During this degree study, he conducted field 
work for a randomized controlled field experiment, on which he later wrote his thesis. In his PhD work, 
he used new institutional economics and transaction cost theory to research smallholder sourcing 
arrangements, focusing in particular on the factors driving the specific form of model chosen, the 
success of these models, and how they reach different groups of farmers and affect their wellbeing.  
Marijke D’Haese  
Marijke has lived or worked in Africa most her life, and specializes in the interaction between poverty, 
food security, and the role of market institutions. Most of her work analyses decision-making by rural 
households as farmers of food and cash crops as well as producers or collectors of non-timber forest 
products or traders, testing micro-economic models with primary data. Although she does not have 
previous experience with meta-analysis, she has extensive experience with applied econometrics and 
statistics, and is fluent in Stata. 
Sam Desiere 
Sam obtained his PhD at the department of agricultural economics at Ghent University. He holds a 
master’s degree in economics from the same university. His research interests include food security 
and rural development in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, he 
focused on developing and evaluating indicators to quantify poverty and food security (Desiere et al., 
2015a; Desiere et al., 2015b). This experience is valuable for the framework of this systematic review, 
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as assessing the reliability of outcome variables is an essential step when conducting a careful meta-
analysis. In addition to his research on indicators, he is involved in a research project about the 
agricultural sector in Burundi. In this context, he has gained experience with critically analysing data 
from nationally representative, agricultural surveys. In the framework of this assignment, Sam Desiere 
will contribute to the meta-analysis part of the review. 
Sophia Weituschat 
Sophia Weituschat was born and raised in Berlin, Germany. In 2011, after completing a year at 
Humboldt University, she started to study International Development at Wageningen University. She 
is currently specializing in an MSc in development economics and works as a student assistant.   
Ans Brouwer 
Ans is information specialist Plant Sciences at Wageningen UR Library. She studied Plant sciences at 
Wageningen University. She has more than 30 years of experience in information and collection 
management, teaching information literacy (including EndNote) and performing literature search 
including extensive literature searches for systematic reviews. Her research fields include information 
retrieval, plant sciences in general, plant pathology, plant protection and plant breeding in particular.. 
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Annex 1 – Minutes Advisory Board 
Advisory board meeting “protocol” 
13 February 2015 
 
Introduction 
Attending: 
- Dave Boselie of the Sustainable Trade Platform (IDH), a public-private partnership which co-
invests in sustainable sourcing. 
- John Hellin of CYMMIT, who does agricultural development research on contract farming 
with smallholders, particularly in, but certainly not limited to, cereals. 
- Andrew Shepherd, currently consultant, ex-FAO and CTA, “the Shepherd in Eaton and 
Shepherd (2001)”, with broad policy and writing experience on contract farming. 
- Jane Njuguna, AGRA, one of the donors of the study, working with smallholder farmers in 18 
African countries, taking a value chain approach to poverty alleviation. 
- Ruerd Ruben, Research Coordinator Food Security, Value Chains & Impact Analysis at LEI - 
Wageningen University, impact of value chains on food security. 
- Martina Vojtkova, who is responsible for this systematic review in 3ie and will provide 
technical and methodological support. 
- Nicoliene Oudwater from DFID, one of the donors of the study, who is interested in how value 
chain interventions such as contract farming affect uptake of technology 
- Wytse Vellema, project researcher, is a PhD candidate at Ghent University studying 
smallholder integration into global value chains, focusing on business models and impact. 
- Giel Ton, project leader, based at LEI, is experienced in impact evaluations and farmer 
organizations specializing in Latin America. 
 
Excused:  
- Marijke D’Haese, project researcher, professor Rural Development Economics at Ghent 
University. 
 
In brief 
 
After a brief round of introductions (see above), the meeting was held in two rounds. In the first round, 
remaining issues after adoption of the comments of each board member in the latest version of the 
protocol were discussed. This discussion focused on the definition and measurement of smallholders. 
Some refinements were suggested and adopted. In the second round, the scope of the qualitative 
synthesis was discussed. Given the heterogeneity among contracts, products, farmers, and contexts, 
the decision was made to focus on annual crops, distinguishing between perishable and non-
perishable products. What follows are the more detailed minutes of the meeting. 
 
Minutes of the meeting 
 
Protocol 
Dave Boselie stressed the importance of the profile of farmers. It is important to distinguish between 
different typologies or clusters of farmers, and their characteristics compared to other farmers, as this 
is expected to affect both the type of contract as well as its impact. 
John Hellin made two points. First, that the livelihood diversity should be taken into account, 
particularly the question to what extent contract farming generates opportunities in uptake of non-
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agricultural activities and investments. Second, potential risk mitigation of contracts, mentioning the 
example of including crop index insurance in contracts.  
Andrew Shepherd discussed the scope of the review. As most farmers in Africa are smallholder 
farmers, he rejected the concept of using a maximum number of hectares to define a farmer as a 
smallholder. Only large commercial estates should be excluded. Furthermore, it is important to bear 
in mind that most businesses do not focus on the poorest of the poor. 
Jane Njuguna concurred with Andrew that land size is not a valid criterion, as this differs markedly 
between countries and contexts. In her experience, not only the contract itself but also the way 
farmers are organized matters: group versus individual contracts. As farmers often self-select, it is 
often the more commercially oriented farmers who seek market access through contracts. Finally, the 
size of the labour commitment is often substantial. When information is available, this should be 
included in the evaluation. 
Ruerd Ruben was happy to see the change from household income to net household income in the 
protocol, as substitution effects between activities are likely to be substantial. An important additional 
effect is the certainty or reduced variability of income. Furthermore, he noted that different products 
have different contracts, giving the example of perishable products such as vegetables and milk. A 
final consideration, understandably outside of the scope, is the firm side of the contract.  
Martina Vojtkova suggested we think critically about how to operationalize the definition of 
smallholders and potential subgroups or clusters. The same should be done for outcomes. A primary 
outcome is an outcome a study is required to contain in order to be included in the review. Other 
outcomes are complementary, and can be used to provide additional information. The heterogeneity 
between contracts, products, farmers, and contexts can be accounted for with random effects meta-
analysis. 
Nicoliene Oudwater concurred with John on the importance of mapping the impact of contracts on 
livelihood opportunities outside of farming. The “opportunity to diversify” is an important outcome in 
itself, even without direct income effects. Important not to exclude non-agricultural activities or 
investment in education.  
 
Follow-up actions 
The discussion focused on two points: farmers and outcomes. Further refinement of the definition of 
smallholder farmers is important, taking into account the type of farmers and recognising 
heterogeneity between groups of farmers. However, this definition will not be used ex-ante to exclude 
studies from the review. Rather, the definitions used in each paper will be used. The review will look 
how this is done in each of the studies selected for meta-analysis and will use the four criteria used by 
Steward (mentioned in the protocol)  to map how this is done in the studies.  Furthermore, the 
endogeneity between contract, product, and type of farmers should be taken into account. The 
changes in time in characteristics of contracted farmers will be discussed in detail. Organization of 
farmer support (groups, cooperatives, associations), present in many contract farming arrangements, 
should be taken into account.  
Several suggestions were made to specify relevant outcomes. Rather than focus on net income from 
the contracted product, the focus should be on net income effects, as this accounts for possible 
substitution effects. As contracts have an important risk mitigation function, sometimes including 
specific insurance clauses, their effect on the certainty of income should be considered. Another 
important consideration is the labour commitment required. Finally, the importance of contracts for 
generating income-generating opportunities outside of agriculture are of particular interest, as it 
allows mapping livelihood trajectories.  
Finally, heterogeneity between farmers, contracts, contract organization, products was mentioned at 
various points in the discussion. For the meta-analysis, this heterogeneity will be illustrated in the 
meta-analysis, taking into account the sources of heterogeneity mentioned in the discussion, i.e. 
farmer type, crop insurance, group or individual farmer organisation, and contract and product 
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characteristics. Only when the treatment and outcome variables are sufficiently comparable, pooled 
random effects will be presented in the meta analysis output. 
 
Qualitative synthesis 
Topic was introduced by Giel, who posited the question of how to get most relevant information out 
of the qualitative part of the synthesis, i.e. the optimal balance between breadth and depth. Given the 
heterogeneity between contracts and the endogeneity of contract type with crop type, a possible 
solution would be to focus on only one product group. Fruits and vegetables, the largest group, would 
then be the most likely option.  
Dave Boselie initially dropped out of the conversation but was able to join again while Andrew was 
speaking. After listening to the others, he understood the rationale and agreed with the suggestions 
made. 
John Hellin agreed that to obtain sufficient depth and maintain comparability, focusing on a more 
uniform type of contractual arrangements would make sense. Fruits and vegetable contracts were the 
obvious candidate. 
Andrew Shepherd suggested to focus on annual crops, rather than fruits and vegetables. Annual crops 
are a relevant group, because they are easy to move into and out of, which makes it better possible 
to assess if the contractual arrangements serves smallholders or not. Perennials require a completely 
different relationship between company and farmer.  
Jane Njuguna missed her turn due to connection problems and later concurred with the suggestions 
made. 
Ruerd Ruben concurred with Andrew on the difference between annual and perennial crops, and 
suggested that out of the two, annual crops were by far the more interesting. Within the annual crops, 
a distinction should be made between perishable and non-perishable products, as this characteristic 
strongly influences contract conditions.  
Martina Vojtkova made three main points. First, that a good way to focus the qualitative synthesis 
would be to focus on the same instances to which also the quantitative studies referred to. In other 
words, to only use the qualitative literature referring directly to projects or contracts which are part 
of the meta-analysis. This makes the qualitative studies support the main research question on 
effectiveness. Second, that a general framework could be build using the information from the 
broader set of qualitative and quantitative studies. This framework could provide a comparison for 
the information obtained on each empirical instances. Third, selection of qualitative studies to include 
for building the framework should be based on some predetermined criteria, to make sure low quality 
studies were excluded from contributing to the framework. 
Nicoliene Oudwater had no further additions to what had already been said, and agreed with the 
general approach discussed. 
 
Follow-up actions 
To gain sufficient depth and ensure comparability between studies, the qualitative synthesis will focus 
on contracts for annual crops. A distinction will be made between perishable and non-perishable 
products. To answer the second research question, the team will search for complementary 
qualitative and quantitative studies that directly relate to one of the empirical instances included in 
the meta-analysis. When used to infer about barriers and enablers for effectiveness, the quality of 
each of these studies will be assessed.  More general studies and conceptual literature will be used 
but without necessarily resulting from a systematic screening of all possible qualitative studies. The 
process will thus be different to the systematic search and screening process to derive the quantitative 
studies for the meta analysis). 
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General comments 
A final round of general comments was held to give everybody an opportunity to discuss topics not 
yet or insufficiently emphasized during the rest of the meeting. 
Dave Boselie discussed the cases that IDH was currently involved in. Two of these cases, in Ethiopia 
and South Africa, were considered to be of particular interest. It was agreed to share relevant 
information. 
John Hellin expressed his interest in research resulting from the project, and asked about what more 
was expected from the advisory board. A brief timeline is given in the conclusion below. 
Andrew Shepherd wondered to what extent third-party arrangements like cooperatives or third-party 
input provision were covered by the review. The answer was that the primary criterion to include or 
exclude a study would be the existence of a direct relation between the contract with the firm and the 
services made available to the farmer. When, next to material or financial resources third-party 
services like certification are present, these will be considered as contract farming.  
Jane Njuguna had no further comments, indicating her immediate concerns were met. 
Ruerd Ruben stressed the relevance of the history of the contracts in each empirical instance. 
Contracts are not standard, but change over time. The contract type is thus endogenous. He also 
stresses that the systematic review is not ‘classical’, because the treatment is extremely 
heterogeneous and hardly exogenous.  
Martina Vojtkova discussed the timeline of protocol approval and suggested to use the guidelines she 
emailed Giel as much as possible, as these contained the criteria used by the review committee. John, 
the search specialist, has been contacted and promised to provide feedback on the search strategy.  
Nicoliene Oudwater had to leave the call earlier. 
 
Follow-up actions 
The revised version of the protocol is expected to be submitted to 3ie in the week of 16 February 2015. 
The review committee in 3ie is already lined up and feedback will be given as soon as possible, 
including detailed feedback on the search strategy. Hopefully the protocol will be accepted in March. 
If additional searches are necessary, they will be done as soon as possible after protocol acceptance. 
In the meantime, authors of already identified studies will be contacted to obtain data required for 
the meta-analysis. The team will also contact Dave for information on on-going contract farming 
projects. In May the meta-analysis is expected to start. An email will be sent to the advisory board 
members to inform about the selected empirical instances; no detailed feedback is required at this 
stage. In September a first draft synthesis report is expected to be ready. Around that time a feedback 
session and meeting will be planned with the advisory board.  
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Annex 2 – Search strategy 
Elaborated with the kind assistance of John Eyers (3ie) 
Scopus search – Searched 30th September 2015 
( ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( afghanistan  OR  albania  OR  algeria  OR  angola  OR  argentina  OR  armenia  
OR  armenian  OR  aruba  OR  azerbaijan  OR  bangladesh  OR  benin  OR  byelarus  OR  byelorussian  
OR  belarus  OR  belorussian  OR  belorussia  OR  belize  OR  bhutan  OR  bolivia  OR  bosnia  OR  
herzegovina  OR  hercegovina  OR  botswana  OR  brasil  OR  brazil  OR  bulgaria  OR  "Burkina Faso"  
OR  "Burkina Fasso"  OR  "Upper Volta"  OR  burundi  OR  urundi  OR  cambodia  OR  "Khmer Republic"  
OR  kampuchea  OR  cameroon  OR  cameroons  OR  cameron  OR  camerons  OR  "Cape Verde"  
OR  "Central African Republic"  OR  chad  OR  china  OR  colombia  OR  comoros  OR  "Comoro 
Islands"  OR  comores  OR  mayotte  OR  congo  OR  zaire  OR  "Costa Rica*"  OR  "Cote d'Ivoire"  OR  
"Ivory Coast"  OR  cuba  OR  djibouti  OR  "French Somaliland"  OR  dominica  OR  "Dominican 
Republic"  OR  "East Timor"  OR  "East Timur"  OR  "Timor Leste"  OR  ecuador  OR  egypt  OR  "United 
Arab Republic"  OR  "El Salvador"  OR  eritrea  OR  ethiopia  OR  fiji  OR  gabon  OR  "Gabonese 
Republic"  OR  gambia  OR  gaza  OR  "Georgia Republic"  OR  "Georgian Republic"  OR  ghana  OR  
grenada  OR  guatemala  OR  guinea  OR  guiana  OR  guyana  OR  haiti  OR  hungary  OR  honduras  
OR  india  OR  maldives  OR  indonesia  OR  iran  OR  iraq  OR  jamaica  OR  jordan  OR  kazakhstan  
OR  kazakh  OR  kenya  OR  kiribati  OR  korea  OR  kosovo  OR  kyrgyzstan  OR  kirghizia  OR  
"Kyrgyz Republic"  OR  kirghiz  OR  kirgizstan  OR  "Lao PDR"  OR  laos  OR  lebanon  OR  lesotho  
OR  basutoland  OR  liberia  OR  libya  OR  macedonia  OR  madagascar  OR  "Malagasy Republic"  
OR  malaysia  OR  malaya  OR  malay  OR  sabah  OR  sarawak  OR  malawi  OR  mali  OR  "Marshall 
Islands"  OR  mauritania  OR  mauritius  OR  "Agalega Islands"  OR  mexico  OR  micronesia  OR  
"Middle East"  OR  moldova  OR  moldovia  OR  moldovian  OR  mongolia  OR  montenegro  OR  
morocco  OR  ifni  OR  mozambique  OR  myanmar  OR  myanma  OR  burma  OR  namibia  OR  nepal  
OR  "Netherlands Antilles"  OR  "New Caledonia"  OR  nicaragua  OR  niger  OR  nigeria  OR  pakistan  
OR  palau  OR  palestine  OR  panama  OR  paraguay  OR  peru  OR  philippines  OR  philipines  OR  
phillipines  OR  phillippines  OR  "Puerto Ric*"  OR  romania  OR  rumania  OR  roumania  OR  rwanda  
OR  ruanda  OR  "Saint Lucia"  OR  "St Lucia"  OR  "Saint Vincent"  OR  "St Vincent"  OR  grenadines  
OR  samoa  OR  "Samoan Islands"  OR  "Navigator Island"  OR  "Navigator Islands"  OR  "Sao Tome"  
OR  senegal  OR  serbia  OR  montenegro  OR  seychelles  OR  "Sierra Leone"  OR  "Sri Lanka"  OR  
"Solomon Islands"  OR  somalia  OR  "South Africa"  OR  sudan  OR  suriname  OR  surinam  OR  
swaziland  OR  syria  OR  tajikistan  OR  tadzhikistan  OR  tadjikistan  OR  tadzhik  OR  tanzania  OR  
thailand  OR  togo  OR  togolese  republic  OR  tonga  OR  tunisia  OR  turkey  OR  turkmenistan  OR  
turkmen  OR  uganda  OR  ukraine  OR  uzbekistan  OR  uzbek  OR  vanuatu  OR  "New Hebrides"  
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OR  venezuela  OR  vietnam  OR  "Viet Nam"  OR  "West Bank"  OR  yemen  OR  yugoslavia  OR  
zambia  OR  zimbabwe ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Developing Countries"  OR  africa  OR  asia  OR  
caribbean  OR  "West Indies"  OR  "South America"  OR  "Latin America"  OR  "Central America"  OR  
( ( developing  OR  "less* developed"  OR  "under developed"  OR  underdeveloped  OR  "middle 
income"  OR  "low* income"  OR  underserved  OR  "under served"  OR  deprived  OR  poor* )  W/1  ( 
countr*  OR  nation*  OR  population*  OR  world ) ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( developing  OR  
"less* developed"  OR  "under developed"  OR  underdeveloped  OR  "middle income"  OR  "low* 
income" )  W/1  ( economy  OR  economies ) )  OR  ( low*  W/1  ( gdp  OR  gnp  OR  "gross domestic"  
OR  "gross national" ) )  OR  ( low  W/3  middle  W/3  countr* ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( lmic  OR  
lmics  OR  "third world"  OR  "lami countr*" ) )  OR  "transitional countr*" ) ) )  AND  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
( contract*  W/2  farm* ) ) ) ) )  OR  ( ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( afghanistan  OR  albania  OR  algeria  OR  
angola  OR  argentina  OR  armenia  OR  armenian  OR  aruba  OR  azerbaijan  OR  bangladesh  OR  
benin  OR  byelarus  OR  byelorussian  OR  belarus  OR  belorussian  OR  belorussia  OR  belize  OR  
bhutan  OR  bolivia  OR  bosnia  OR  herzegovina  OR  hercegovina  OR  botswana  OR  brasil  OR  
brazil  OR  bulgaria  OR  "Burkina Faso"  OR  "Burkina Fasso"  OR  "Upper Volta"  OR  burundi  OR  
urundi  OR  cambodia  OR  "Khmer Republic"  OR  kampuchea  OR  cameroon  OR  cameroons  OR  
cameron  OR  camerons  OR  "Cape Verde"  OR  "Central African Republic"  OR  chad  OR  china  OR  
colombia  OR  comoros  OR  "Comoro Islands"  OR  comores  OR  mayotte  OR  congo  OR  zaire  OR  
"Costa Rica*"  OR  "Cote d'Ivoire"  OR  "Ivory Coast"  OR  cuba  OR  djibouti  OR  "French Somaliland"  
OR  dominica  OR  "Dominican Republic"  OR  "East Timor"  OR  "East Timur"  OR  "Timor Leste"  OR  
ecuador  OR  egypt  OR  "United Arab Republic"  OR  "El Salvador"  OR  eritrea  OR  ethiopia  OR  fiji  
OR  gabon  OR  "Gabonese Republic"  OR  gambia  OR  gaza  OR  "Georgia Republic"  OR  "Georgian 
Republic"  OR  ghana  OR  grenada  OR  guatemala  OR  guinea  OR  guiana  OR  guyana  OR  haiti  
OR  hungary  OR  honduras  OR  india  OR  maldives  OR  indonesia  OR  iran  OR  iraq  OR  jamaica  
OR  jordan  OR  kazakhstan  OR  kazakh  OR  kenya  OR  kiribati  OR  korea  OR  kosovo  OR  
kyrgyzstan  OR  kirghizia  OR  "Kyrgyz Republic"  OR  kirghiz  OR  kirgizstan  OR  "Lao PDR"  OR  laos  
OR  lebanon  OR  lesotho  OR  basutoland  OR  liberia  OR  libya  OR  macedonia  OR  madagascar  
OR  "Malagasy Republic"  OR  malaysia  OR  malaya  OR  malay  OR  sabah  OR  sarawak  OR  malawi  
OR  mali  OR  "Marshall Islands"  OR  mauritania  OR  mauritius  OR  "Agalega Islands"  OR  mexico  
OR  micronesia  OR  "Middle East"  OR  moldova  OR  moldovia  OR  moldovian  OR  mongolia  OR  
montenegro  OR  morocco  OR  ifni  OR  mozambique  OR  myanmar  OR  myanma  OR  burma  OR  
namibia  OR  nepal  OR  "Netherlands Antilles"  OR  "New Caledonia"  OR  nicaragua  OR  niger  OR  
nigeria  OR  pakistan  OR  palau  OR  palestine  OR  panama  OR  paraguay  OR  peru  OR  philippines  
OR  philipines  OR  phillipines  OR  phillippines  OR  "Puerto Ric*"  OR  romania  OR  rumania  OR  
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roumania  OR  rwanda  OR  ruanda  OR  "Saint Lucia"  OR  "St Lucia"  OR  "Saint Vincent"  OR  "St 
Vincent"  OR  grenadines  OR  samoa  OR  "Samoan Islands"  OR  "Navigator Island"  OR  "Navigator 
Islands"  OR  "Sao Tome"  OR  senegal  OR  serbia  OR  montenegro  OR  seychelles  OR  "Sierra 
Leone"  OR  "Sri Lanka"  OR  "Solomon Islands"  OR  somalia  OR  "South Africa"  OR  sudan  OR  
suriname  OR  surinam  OR  swaziland  OR  syria  OR  tajikistan  OR  tadzhikistan  OR  tadjikistan  OR  
tadzhik  OR  tanzania  OR  thailand  OR  togo  OR  togolese  republic  OR  tonga  OR  tunisia  OR  
turkey  OR  turkmenistan  OR  turkmen  OR  uganda  OR  ukraine  OR  uzbekistan  OR  uzbek  OR  
vanuatu  OR  "New Hebrides"  OR  venezuela  OR  vietnam  OR  "Viet Nam"  OR  "West Bank"  OR  
yemen  OR  yugoslavia  OR  zambia  OR  zimbabwe ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Developing 
Countries"  OR  africa  OR  asia  OR  caribbean  OR  "West Indies"  OR  "South America"  OR  "Latin 
America"  OR  "Central America"  OR  ( ( developing  OR  "less* developed"  OR  "under developed"  
OR  underdeveloped  OR  "middle income"  OR  "low* income"  OR  underserved  OR  "under served"  
OR  deprived  OR  poor* )  W/1  ( countr*  OR  nation*  OR  population*  OR  world ) ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( ( ( developing  OR  "less* developed"  OR  "under developed"  OR  underdeveloped  OR  
"middle income"  OR  "low* income" )  W/1  ( economy  OR  economies ) )  OR  ( low*  W/1  ( gdp  OR  
gnp  OR  "gross domestic"  OR  "gross national" ) )  OR  ( low  W/3  middle  W/3  countr* ) ) )  OR  ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( ( lmic  OR  lmics  OR  "third world"  OR  "lami countr*" ) )  OR  "transitional countr*" 
) ) )  AND  ( ( TITLE ( "Food security"  OR  poverty  OR  "household* income*" )  OR  ABS ( "Food 
security"  OR  poverty  OR  "household* income*" )  OR  TITLE ( ( increas*  OR  improv*  OR  lower*  
OR  decreas*  OR  diminish*  OR  reduc*  OR  loss  OR  declin*  OR  slump  OR  dwindl*  OR  curtail*  
OR  restrict*  OR  shrink*  OR  fall )  W/3  ( income*  OR  revenue*  OR  yield*  OR  productivity ) )  OR  
ABS ( ( increas*  OR  improv*  OR  lower*  OR  decreas*  OR  diminish*  OR  reduc*  OR  loss  OR  
declin*  OR  slump  OR  dwindl*  OR  curtail*  OR  restrict*  OR  shrink*  OR  fall )  W/3  ( income*  OR  
revenue*  OR  yield*  OR  productivity ) )  OR  TITLE ( "market power"  OR  net-return*  OR  "net return*"  
OR  outcome*  OR  effect*  OR  impact )  OR  ABS ( "market power"  OR  net-return*  OR  "net return*"  
OR  outcome*  OR  effect*  OR  impact ) )  AND  ( TITLE ( contract*  OR  "nucleus estate*"  OR  
cooperative*  OR  "producer* association*" )  OR  ABS ( contract*  OR  "nucleus estate*"  OR  
cooperative*  OR  "producer* association*" )  OR  TITLE ( embedded  W/3  service* )  OR  ABS ( 
embedded  W/3  service* )  OR  TITLE ( ( pre-harvest )  W/2  ( agreement*  OR  sales ) )  OR  ABS ( ( 
pre-harvest )  W/2  ( agreement*  OR  sales ) )  OR  TITLE ( "value chain*"  OR  farm-firm*  OR  outgrow* 
)  OR  ABS ( "value chain*"  OR  farm-firm*  OR  outgrow* )  OR  TITLE ( ( vertical )  W/3  ( integration  
OR  coordination  OR  linkage* ) )  OR  ABS ( ( vertical )  W/3  ( integration  OR  coordination  OR  
linkage* ) ) )  AND  ( ( TITLE ( farm*  OR  smallhold*  OR  "small hold*"  OR  small-hold* )  OR  ABS ( 
farm*  OR  smallhold*  OR  "small hold*"  OR  small-hold* )  OR  TITLE ( ( small-scale  OR  "small scale" 
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)  W/3  ( producer* ) )  OR  ABS ( ( small-scale  OR  "small scale" )  W/3  ( producer* ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE 
( agricultur*  OR  outgrower*  OR  "small farmer*"  OR  "small grower*" )  OR  ABS ( agricultur*  OR  
outgrower*  OR  "small farmer*"  OR  "small grower*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE ( ( vegetable*  OR  fruit  OR  
livestock  OR  dairy  OR  milk  OR  beef  OR  poultry  OR  pig*  OR  flower*  OR  cereal  OR  tea  OR  
soybean*  OR  rice  OR  coffee  OR  potato*  OR  sugarcane  OR  mushroom*  OR  maize  OR  millet  
OR  pepper*  OR  crop  OR  crops )  W/3  ( produc*  OR  grow* ) )  OR  ABS ( ( vegetable*  OR  fruit  
OR  livestock  OR  dairy  OR  milk  OR  beef  OR  poultry  OR  pig*  OR  flower*  OR  cereal  OR  tea  
OR  soybean*  OR  rice  OR  coffee  OR  potato*  OR  sugarcane  OR  mushroom*  OR  maize  OR  
millet  OR  pepper*  OR  crop  OR  crops )  W/3  ( produc*  OR  grow* ) ) )  OR  ( TITLE ( floriculture )  
OR  ABS ( floriculture ) ) ) ) ) )     - 973 hits 
 
 
CAB Abstracts search – Searched 29th September 2015 
- Database: CAB Abstracts  
19     ("Food security" or poverty or "household* income*" or ((lower* or decreas* or diminish* or reduc* 
or loss or declin* or slump or dwindl* or curtail* or restrict* or shrink* or fall) adj3 (income* or revenue* 
or yield* or productivity)) or "market power" or net-return* or "net return*" or outcome* or effect* or 
impact).ti,ab,sh. (2095228)  
21     (Contract* or "nucleus estate*" or cooperative* or "producer* association*" or (embedded adj3 
service*) or (pre-harvest adj2 (agreement* or sales)) or "value chain*" or farm-firm* or outgrow* or 
(vertical adj3 (integration or coordination or linkage*))).ti,ab,sh. (52881) 
23     (Farm* or smallhold* or "small hold*" or small-hold* or ((small-scale or "small scale") adj3 
producer*) or agricultur* or outgrower* or "small farmer*" or "small grower*" or ((vegetable* or fruit or 
livestock or dairy or milk or beef or poultry or pig* or flower* or cereal or tea or soybean* or rice or coffee 
or potato* or sugarcane or mushroom* or maize or millet or pepper* or crop or crops) adj3 (produc* or 
grow*)) or floriculture).ti,ab,sh. (943886) 
24     (Afghanistan or Angola or Albania or "American Samoa" or Argentina or Armenia or Armenian or 
Azerbaijan or Bangladesh or Belarus or Belize or Benin or Bolivia or Bosnia or Herzegovina or Botswana 
or Brazil or Bulgaria or Burkina Faso or Burkina Fasso or Burundi or Urundi or Cambodia or Cameroon 
or Cameroons or Cameron or Camerons or Central African Republic or Chad or China or Colombia or 
Comoros or Comoro Islands or Comores or Congo or Costa Rica or Cuba or Zaire or Cote d'Ivoire or 
Ivory Coast or Djibouti or Dominica* or East Timor or East Timur or Timor Leste or Ecuador or Egypt or 
United Arab Republic or El Salvador or Eritrea or Ethiopia or Fiji or Gabon or Gambia or Gaza or Georgia 
Republic or Georgian Republic or Ghana or Grenada or Guatemala or Guinea or Guiana or Guyana or 
Haiti or Honduras or Hungary or India or Indonesia or Iran or Iraq or Kazakhstan or Kenya or Kiribati or 
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Korea or Kosovo or Kyrgyzstan or Kirghizia or Kyrgyz Republic or Kirghiz or Kirgizstan or Lao PDR or 
Laos or Lebanon or Lesotho or Liberia or Libya or Macedonia or Madagascar or Malagasy Republic or 
Malawi or Malaysia or Maldives or Marshall Islands or Mali or Mauritania or Mauritius or Agalega Islands 
or Mexico or Micronesia or Moldova or Moldovia or Moldovian or Mongolia or Montenegro or Morocco 
or Ifni or Mozambique or Myanmar or Myanma or Burma or Namibia or Nepal or Nicaragua or Niger or 
Nigeria or Pakistan or Palau or Palestine or Panama or Paraguay or Peru or Philippines or Philipines 
or Phillipines or Phillippines or Romania or Rwanda or Ruanda or Samoa or Samoan Islands or Sao 
Tome or Senegal or Serbia or Seychelles or Sierra Leone or Sri Lanka or Solomon Islands or Somalia 
or South Africa or St Lucia or St Vincent or Grenadines or Sudan or Suriname or Swaziland or Syria or 
Tajikistan or Tadzhikistan or Tadjikistan or Tadzhik or Tanzania or Thailand or Tonga or Togo or 
Togolese Republic or Tunisia or Turkey or Turkmenistan or Tuvalu or Uganda or Ukraine or Uzbekistan 
or Uzbek or Vanuatu or Venezuela or New Hebrides or Vietnam or Viet Nam or West Bank or Yemen 
or Zambia or Zimbabwe).hw,ti,ab,cp. (2004287) 
25     ((developing or less* developed or under developed or underdeveloped or middle income or low* 
income or underserved or under served or deprived or poor*) adj (countr* or nation? or population? or 
world)).ti,ab. (44493) 
26     ((developing or less* developed or under developed or underdeveloped or middle income or low* 
income) adj (economy or economies)).ti,ab. (712) 
27     (low* adj (gdp or gnp or gross domestic or gross national)).ti,ab. (43) 
28     (low adj3 middle adj3 countr*).ti,ab. (1881) 
29     (lmic or lmics or third world or lami countr*).ti,ab. (2264) 
30     transitional countr*.ti,ab. (78) 
31     exp developing countries/ (1347769) 
32     or/24-31 (2068603) 
33     22 and 23 and 32 (9796) 
34     19 and 22 and 23 and 32 (3496) 
*************************** 
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Annex 3 - Coding tool 
  ID Question Description Coding 
FIRST CODING BLOCK - EPPI REVIEWER 
CODING RELEVANT FOR ALL QUANTITATIVE STUDIES INCLUDED AFTER FULL-TEXT SCREENING 
General ID Unique study 
identification # 
EPPI EPPI Internal ID 
  ABSTRACT Abstract Abstract (EPPI) Text 
  PUB DATE Publication date Year of publication of study (EPPI) Year 
  PUB TYPE Publication type Publication type (EPPI) 1= Peer-reviewed journal 
2= Book chapter/book 
3= Unpublished report 
4 = Conference proceedings 
5 = Other 
  RELEVANCE Relevance Relevance 1 = Relevance 
2 = Methodology 
3 = Relevance and methodology 
Study design STUDY DESIGN Design type Randomised experiment makes comparisons with a 
control group measured in the same time period as 
the treatment group, with randomised assignment of 
the contract to each group;  
Quasi-experiment means assignment to intervention 
within treatment group is random, but treatment and 
intervention groups are non-equivalent groups.  
Observables are used  to match treatment and 
comparison groups, e.g. PSM, instrumental variables, 
covariate matching, regression discontinuity designs, 
etc. 
Non-experiment do not use a control group nor 
multiple measurements in time. 
1= Randomised experiment 
2= Quasi-experiment 
3= Non-experiment 
      If quasi-experiment: what design is used (e.g. PSM, 
DID, IV) 
Specify (text) 
 44 
  ID Question Description Coding 
  COMPARISON  Comparison group of 
farmers 
Farmers in the comparison group are selling 
independent (no group selling), 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
      Farmers in the comparison group have no contract 
with any firm 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
      Farmers in the comparison group  sell all their 
produce in the traditional or spot market 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
  MEASUREMENT FREQ Measurement frequency How often were farmers in the intervention and 
control group interviewed and compared? 
1= Comparison at single point in 
time 
2= Comparison at two points in 
time 
3= Comparison at more than 
two points in time 
  INTERVENTION PERIOD Length of follow-up  How much time has passed between the start of the 
contract farming arrangement and the measurement 
of effects? 
Specify (textt) 
  STUDY TYPE Study type Does the study refers to an empirical instance of 
contract farming with a comparisons group or other 
credible counterfactual design to measure 
effectiveness? 
1 = Yes = Quantitative 
effectiveness study useful for 
meta-analysis 
2 = No = Quantitative 
effectiveness study not useful 
for meta-analysis 
  REL-INFO Rel-info Reasons for exclusion from meta-analysis Specify (text) 
END FIRST CODING BLOCK 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
SECOND CODING BLOCK - EPPI REVIEWERONLY FOR STUDIES INCLUDED FOR META-ANALYSIS 
Intervention CONTRACT PARTY Contract party The type of organization the farmer signed the 
contract with 
1= Private firm 
2= Farmers cooperative 
3= NGO 
4= Other 
8= Not clear 
  CONTR PARTY OTH Contract party if other The type of organization the farmer signed the 
contract with 
Open answer 
  CONSTITUYENTS Is study in its 
effectiveness analysis 
considering 
smallholders? 
YES = Reporting needs to comply with at least two 
out of four criteria 
1. Limited size of farm (reported as compared to 
other farms in the sector) 
2. Mostly dependent on family labour 
3. Subsistence farming or mix of subsistence and 
market-oriented farming 
4. Reportedly limited resources in terms of land, 
technical and technological support, and/or capital 
for maintenance and investment. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
  DEF-SMALLH Criteria used 1. Limited size of farm (reported as compared to 
other farms in the sector) 
2. Mostly dependent on family labour 
3. Subsistence farming or mix of subsistence and 
market-oriented farming 
4. Reportedly limited resources in terms of land, 
technical and technological support, and/or capital 
for maintenance and investment. 
List 1, 2, 3.... 
    Definition of smallholder Definition of smallholder used in the study Specify (text) 
  FORMAL  Written or verbal Whether the contract is written or verbal  1= Written 
2= Verbal 
8= Not clear 
  PREPLANTING Pre-planting Contracted before production begins? 1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
  RESOURCE PROVISIONING Seed provisioning Any seed or plant provisioning included in the 
contract conditions 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Agro-chemicals 
provisioning 
Any agro-chemicals provisioning included in the 
contract conditions 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Credit provisioning Any credit provisioning in money included in the 
contract conditions (do not include seeds, agro-
chemicals, or extension here)  
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Other resource/service 
provided 
Other implements, tools, infrastructure, etc. Specify (text) 
  TRAINING Extension provisioning Any extension provided to contract farmers 1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Extension provider Type of organisation providing the extension 1= Private firm 
2= Farmers cooperative 
3= NGO 
4= Other 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
  PROCESS OR PRDUCT 
CONDITIONS 
Production conditions Process conditions included in the contract, regarding 
input use, crop varietal, health and safety regulations, 
labour regulations, etc. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
    Marketing conditions Product conditions included in the contract, 
regarding quality, timing of delivery, food safety 
(residues), traceability, etc. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
    Environmental 
conditions 
Environmental conditions included in the contract, 
regarding on-farm biodiversity, water and waste 
management, pollution, etc. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
    Other conditions Other proocess or product conditions mentioned in 
the study 
Specify (text) 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
  PAYMENT Price determination and 
payment system 
Agreed price determination and payment system? 1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
  DISPUTE Dispute resolution Is a dispute resolution mechanism mentioned? 1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
  RIGHTS Rights of firm Is there a non-transferable right and legal title to the 
crop for the firm? 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
9= N/A 
Mapping empirical 
instances 
SECTOR Type of crop Type of crop under contract 1 = Annual crops perishable 
2 = Annual crops non-perishable 
3 = Perennial  crops 
4 = Animal husbandry 
5 = Multiple/mixed 
  CROPS Contracted crops The crops contracted Crop 1, crop 2, etc 
  REGION Region Region of empirical instance of contract farming 
arrangement 
1 = Africa 
2 = Latin America 
3 = Asia 
4 = Europe 
5 = Oceania 
6 = North America 
  COUNTRY Country Countries of empirical instance of contract farming 
arrangements in study 
Country 1, country 2, etc 
  TYPE Type of contractual 
arrangement 
Type of contract farming (multiple categories 
allowed) 
1 = Contract farming only 
2 = Certification included 
3 = Forward sales included 
4 = Collective marketing 
included 
5 = Risk insurance included 
6 = Access to support services 
included 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
Outcomes ULTIMATE OUTCOMES Ultimate outcomes Household income 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
       Household food security 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Market power 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
       
Livelihood strategies of contracting farmers 
1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Positive spill-over effects on non-contracting farmers 
(income, knowledge, ..) 
1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Increased interest from (formerly) non participating 
farmers in becoming a contracted farmer 
1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Negative spill-over effects on non-contracting 
farmers (pollution, exclusion, ..) 
1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
       Other Specify 
  INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES Intermediate outcomes Agricultural practices 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Yields or other productivity measure 1 = Important 
2 = Not important 
8 = Unclear importance 
      Crop revenue, profit, or other variable on crop 
income 
1 = Important 
2 = Not important 
8 = Unclear importance 
      Financial risk exposure 1 = Important 
2 = Not important 
8 = Unclear importance 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
       Health and food safety 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Other Specify 
IMPACT DEVELOPMENT IMPACT Agricultural sector 
development 
Poverty alleviation 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Economic growth 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      National food security 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Employment 1 = Reported 
2 = Not reported 
8 = Unclear 
      Other Specify 
END SECOND CODING BLOCK 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
THIRD CODING BLOCK - EPPI REVIEWERRISK OF BIAS TOOL FOR OUTCOMES COVERED IN THE META-ANALYSIS 
RISK OF BIAS 
(Hombrados and 
Waddington, 2014) 
1. Was bias in the 
mechanism of assignment 
prevented? 
RCT Yes = a random component in the sequence 
generation process is described (e.g. referring to a 
random number table);  and if the unit of allocation 
was at group level (geographical/ social/ institutional 
unit) and allocation was performed on all units at the 
start of the study,  or if the unit of allocation was by 
beneficiary or group and there was some form of 
centralised allocation mechanism such as an on-site 
computer system;  and if the unit of allocation is 
based on a sufficiently large sample size to equate 
groups on average. 
 
UNCLEAR= the paper does not provide details on the 
randomisation process, or uses a quasi-
randomization process for which it is not clear has 
generated allocations equivalent to true 
randomisation. 
 
NO = the sample size is not sufficient or any failure in 
the allocation mechanism could affect the 
randomisation process. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Regression Discontinuity 
Designs 
Yes =  allocation is made based on a pre-determined 
discontinuity on a continuous variable (regression 
discontinuity design) and blinded to participants or,  
if not blinded, individuals reasonably cannot affect 
the assignment variable in response to knowledge of 
the participation decision rule; and the sample size 
immediately at both sides of the cut-off point is 
sufficiently large to equate groups on average. 
 
UNCLEAR = the assignment variable is either non-
blinded or it is unclear whether participants can 
affect it in response to knowledge of the allocation 
mechanism. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
 
NO = if: · the sample size is not sufficient or there is 
evidence that participants altered the assignment 
variable prior to assignment 
    non-randomised 
programme placement 
and self-selection 
(including matching 
strategies, excluding IV) 
Yes =  Participants and non-participants are either 
matched based on all relevant characteristics 
explaining participation and outcomes, or all relevant 
characteristics are accounted for. 
 
UNCLEAR = it is not clear whether all relevant 
characteristics (only relevant time varying 
characteristics in the case of panel data regressions) 
are controlled. 
 
NO =  relevant characteristics are omitted from the 
analysis. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Instrumental variable 
estimation 
YES =  An appropriate instrumental variable is used 
which is exogenously generated: e.g. due to a 
‘natural’ experiment or random allocation. 
 
UNCLEAR = the exogeneity of the instrument is 
unclear (both externally as well as why the variable 
should not enter by itself in the outcome equation). 
 
NO = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
  2. Was bias due to group 
equivalence prevented? 
RCT YES =  baseline characteristics of the study and 
control/-comparisons are reported and overall similar 
based on t-test or ANOVA for equality of means 
across groups,  or covariate differences are controlled 
using multivariate analysis;  and the attrition rates 
are sufficiently low and similar in treatment and 
control, or the study assesses that loss to follow up 
units are random draws from the sample; and 
problems with cross-overs and drop outs are dealt 
with using intention-to-treat analysis or in the case of 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
drop outs, by assessing whether the drop outs are 
random draws from the population; and, for cluster-
assignment, authors control for external cluster-level 
factors that might confound the impact of the 
programme  through multivariate analysis. 
 
UNCLEAR =  insufficient details are provided on 
covariate differences or methods of adjustment; or 
insufficient details are provided on cluster controls. 
 
NO = otherwise 
    Regression Discontinuity 
Designs 
YES = the interval for selection of treatment and 
control group is reasonably small, or authors have 
weighted the matches on their distance to the cut-off 
point, and the mean of the covariates of the 
individuals immediately at both sides of the cut-off 
point (selected sample of participants and non-
participants) are overall not statistically different 
based on t-test or ANOVA for equality of means,  or 
significant differences have been controlled in 
multivariate analysis;  and, for cluster-assignment, 
authors control for external cluster-level factors that 
might confound the impact of the programme (eg 
weather, infrastructure, community fixed effects, etc) 
through multivariate analysis. 
 
UNCLEAR = there are covariate differences across 
individuals at both sides of the discontinuity which 
have not been controlled for using multivariate 
analysis, or if insufficient details are provided on 
controls, or if insufficient details are provided on 
cluster controls. 
 
NO = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    statistical matching YES = the authors use a difference-in-differences (or 1= Yes 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
studies including 
propensity scores (PSM) 
and covariate matching 
fixed effects) multivariate estimation method; the 
authors control for a comprehensive set of time-
varying characteristics; · and the attrition rate is 
sufficiently low and similar in treatment and control, 
or the study assesses that drop-outs are random 
draws from the sample (e.g. by examining correlation 
with determinants of outcomes, in both treatment 
and comparison groups);  and, for cluster-
assignment, authors control for external cluster-level 
factors that might confound the impact of the 
programme (eg weather, infrastructure, community 
fixed effects, etc) through multivariate analysis. 
 
UNCLEAR =  insufficient details are provided, ·or if 
insufficient details are provided on cluster controls. 
 
No = otherwise 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    regression-based studies 
using cross sectional data 
(excluding IV) 
YES = matching is either on baseline characteristics or 
time-invariant characteristics which cannot be 
affected by participation in the programme; and the 
variables used to match are relevant (e.g. 
demographic and socio-economic factors) to explain 
both participation and the outcome (so that there 
can be no evident differences across groups in 
variables that might explain outcomes)  In addition, 
for PSM Rosenbaum’s test suggests the results are 
not sensitive to the existence of hidden bias.  and, 
with the exception of Kernel matching, the means of 
the individual covariates are equated for treatment 
and comparison groups after matching; and, for 
cluster-assignment, authors control for external 
cluster-level factors that might confound the impact 
of the programme (eg weather, infrastructure, 
community fixed effects, etc) through multivariate or 
any appropriate analysis. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
 
UNCLEAR = relevant variables are not included in the 
matching equation, or if matching is based on 
characteristics collected at endline, or if insufficient 
details are provided on cluster controls. 
 
NO = otherwise 
    instrumental variables 
approaches 
YES = the instrumenting equation is significant at the 
level of F≥10 (or if an F test is not reported, the 
authors report and assess whether the R-squared 
(goodness of fit) of the participation equation is 
sufficient for appropriate identification);  the 
identifying instruments are individually significant 
(p≤0.01); for Heckman models, the identifiers are 
reported and significant (p≤0.05);where at least two 
instruments are used, the authors report on an over-
identifying test (p≤0.05 is required to reject the null 
hypothesis); and none of the covariate controls can 
be affected by participation and the study 
convincingly assesses qualitatively why the 
instrument only affects the outcome via participation 
and, for cluster-assignment, authors particularly 
control for external cluster-level factors that might 
confound the impact of the programme (eg weather, 
infrastructure, community fixed effects, etc) through 
multivariate analysis. 
 
UNCLEAR = relevant confounders are controlled but 
appropriate statistical tests are not reported or 
exogeneity13 of the instrument is not convincing, or 
if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls 
(see category f) below). 
 
NO = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
  3. Is bias due to Hawthorne 
and John Henry effects 
prevented? 
Was the process of being 
observed causing 
motivation bias? 
YES = a) For data collected in the context of a 
particular intervention trial (randomised or non-
randomised assignment), the authors state explicitly 
that the process of monitoring the intervention and 
outcome measurement is blinded, or argue 
convincingly why it is not likely that being monitored 
in ways that could affect the performance of 
participants in treatment and comparison groups in 
different ways. b) The study is based on data 
collected in the context of a survey, and not 
associated with a particular intervention trial, or data 
are collected in the context of a retrospective (ex 
post) evaluation. 
 
UNCLEAR = it is not clear whether the authors use an 
appropriate method to prevent Hawthorne and John 
Henry Effects (e.g. blinding of outcomes and, or 
enumerators, other methods to ensure consistent 
monitoring across groups). 
 
No = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
  4. Are SPILL-OVER effects 
properly addressed? 
Was the study 
adequately protected 
against spill-over bias? 
YES = the intervention is unlikely to spill-over to 
comparisons (e.g. participants and non-participants 
are geographically and/or socially separated from 
one another and general equilibrium effects are 
unlikely) 
 
UNCLEAR = spill-overs are not addressed clearly. 
 
NO = allocation was at individual or household level 
and there are likely spill-overs within households and 
communities which are not controlled for in the 
analysis;  or if allocation at cluster level and there are 
likely spill-overs to comparison clusters. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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  5. Selective outcome 
reporting: 
Was the study free from 
outcome reporting bias? 
YES = there is no evidence that outcomes were 
selectively reported (e.g. all relevant outcomes in the 
methods section are reported in the results section). 
 
NO = some important outcomes are subsequently 
omitted from the results or the significance and 
magnitude of important outcomes was not assessed. 
 
UNCLEAR = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
  6. Selective analysis 
reporting: 
Was the study free from 
analysis reporting bias? 
YES = authors use ‘common’ methods15 of 
estimation and the study does not suggest the 
existence of biased exploratory research methods. 
For PSM and covariate matching, score “YES” if: 
- Where over 10% of participants fail to be matched, 
sensitivity analysis is used to re-estimate results using 
different matching methods (Kernel Matching 
techniques). 
- For matching with replacement, no single 
observation in the control group is matched with a 
large number of observations in the treatment group. 
For IV (including Heckman) models, score “YES” if: 
- the authors test and report the results of a 
Hausman test for exogeneity (p≤0.05 is required to 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity). 
- the coefficient of the selectivity correction term 
(Rho) is significantly different from zero (P<0.05) 
(Heckman approach). 
For studies using multivariate regression analysis, 
score “YES” if: 
- authors conduct appropriate specification tests (e.g. 
reporting results of multicollinearity test, testing 
robustness of results to the inclusion of additional 
variables, etc). 
 
UNCLEAR = unreported 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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NO = authors use uncommon or less rigorous 
estimation methods such as failure to conduct 
multivariate analysis for outcomes equations where it 
is has not been established that covariates are 
balanced. 
  7. Other bias Was the study free from 
other sources of bias? 
YES = the reported results do not suggest any other 
sources of bias. 
 
UNCLEAR = other important threats to validity may 
be present 
 
NO = it is clear that these threats to validity are 
present and not controlled for. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
  8. Statistical conclusion 
validity 
For studies using 
parametric regression 
methods such as OLS: 
Are variables properly 
scales? 
YES = the authors test and fail to reject the null of 
homoscedasticity (e.g. through a Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroscedasticity (p>0.05)) and test for the 
assumed error distribution (e.g. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for non-normality (p>0.05))  or if the test 
suggests the existence of heterogeneity or non-
normality, the study corrects for them (e.g. use of log 
transformation in the dependent variable). 
 
UNCLEAR = the results of any test are not reported. 
 
NO = otherwise 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
    Is the study sufficiently 
powered to detect the 
effects? 
YES = the sample size is enough to detect a relevant 
significant effect. 
 
UNCLEAR = it is not clear whether the sample size is 
sufficiently large to detect medium or large 
significant effects. 
 
NO = the sample size is not sufficiently large to detect 
medium or large significant effects. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
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    For clustered studies: 
Does prevent unit of 
analysis errors? 
YES = the analysis is carried out at the relevant unit of 
treatment assignment,  or the study accounts for lack 
of independence between observations within 
assignment clusters. 
 
UNCLEAR = the study does not report enough 
information on the unit of treatment assignment. 
 
NO = the analysis is carried out at a different unit 
than the assignment. 
1= Yes 
2= No 
8= Not clear 
Meta-analysis METAN (per outcome area - 
per proxy-indicator with the 
least risk of bias) 
  
Meta-analysis Sample size treatment; Outcome measure in 
treatment; SD of outcome measure in treatment 
STATA- metan; EPPI-meta-
analysis 
  
  
  Sample size comparison; Outcome measure in 
comparison; SD of outcome measure in comparison   
  
    Type of effect: Average treatment effect (ATE), 
Average treatment on the treated (ATT), Local 
average treatment effect (LATE), Intention to treat 
effect (ITT) 
1 = ATE 
2 = ATT 
3 = LATE 
4 = ITT 
8 = Other 
END THIRD CODING BLOCK 
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FOURTH CODING BLOCKDATA EXTRACTION FOR EACH OUTCOME AREA IN EXCEL DATA-BASE 
META-ANALYSIS OUTCOME DESCIRPTION OUTCOME DEF Does the study give a precise definition of outcome? 1=Yes 2=No 
  DEFINITION What definition of outcome is given? Open answer 
  METRIC What metric is used in the calculation of the outcome 
variable used in estimation? 
  
  S SIZE METRIC Sample size unit of measurement 1= Farmers 
2= Households 
3= Groups (e.g. village) 
4= Other 
5= Sample size not stated 
  OTHER - METRIC If other, state what Open answer 
SAMPLE SIZE S SIZE TREAT Initial sample size treatment group # 
  S SIZE CONTR Initial sample size control group # 
  ATTRIT TREAT Number of drop-outs # 
  ATTRIT CONTR Number of drop-outs # 
  ATTRIT COMMENT Are assessments made of whether drop-outs are 
unlikely to be randomly selected from sample? If so, 
state covariates reported 
Open answer 
  SAMPLE SIZE Total number of beneficiaries in study (after attrition) # 
  EST SAMPLE Where sample size not provided in study, give 
estimated number 
# 
EFFECT ITT Does the study use ITT analysis? 1=Yes 2=No 9= N/A 
  TOT Does the study use TOT analysis? 1=Yes 2=No 9= N/A 
  ES TYPE Type of effect estimate calculated for meta-analysis 1=Risk/rate 
2=Standardised mean difference 
3=Other 
  ES - OTHER If other, state what Open answer 
OUTCOME VALUES BASELINE T Baseline outcome - Treatment # 
  BASELINE C Baseline outcome - Comparison # 
  ENDLINE T Endline outcome - Treatment # 
  ENDLINE C Endline outcome - Comparison # 
SAMPLE SIZE     # 
ES CALC Calculated ES Calculated effect-size # 
CI L CI lower 95% Confidence interval lower bound reported (X.XX) # 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
CI U CI upper 95% Confidence interval upper bound reported (X.XX) # 
  ES SE Standard error of RR Standard error of estimate # 
  CORRECT SE Standard errors Are standard errors appropriately adjusted for? 1=Yes  
2=No  
8=Not clear  
9= N/A 
  SE COMMENTS Comments on S.E. 
calculation 
Comments on standard error calculation, as reported 
in paper or as calculated from data in paper 
Open answer 
END FOURTH CODING BLOCK 
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FIFTH CODING BLOCK - ALTAS.TIQUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS ON EMPIRICAL INSTANCES  COVERED IN META-ANALYSIS(NOTE: ALSO OTHER STUDIES WITH COMPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION ON THE SAME EMPIRICAL INSTANCES  ARE CODED 
BARRIERS AND 
ENABLERS 
STARTING CONDITIONS Company attributes Organisation of production Text/verbatim 
      Nationality Text/verbatim 
      Ownership Text/verbatim 
     Oher Specify (text) 
    Product attributes Perishability Text/verbatim 
     Production technology Text/verbatim 
     Economies of scale Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
  ENABLING ENVIRONMENT Geographic conditions Climate Text/verbatim 
      Soil type Text/verbatim 
      Access to water Text/verbatim 
      Access to markets Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
    Market conditions Markets and competition Text/verbatim 
      Market regulatiosn Text/verbatim 
      History of economic shocks Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
    Business environment Stakeholder partnerships Text/verbatim 
      Business support services Text/verbatim 
      Presence of financial services Text/verbatim 
      Third party quaity verification Text/verbatim 
      Reliable legal system Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
  PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS Crop characteristics Yields (quality & quantity) Text/verbatim 
      Threshold investments Text/verbatim 
      Profitability Text/verbatim 
      Self-consumption Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
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  FARMER CHARACTERISTICS Smallholder 
characteristics 
Human capital Text/verbatim 
      Social capital Text/verbatim 
      Physical capital Text/verbatim 
      Financial capital Text/verbatim 
      Natural capital Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
  SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS Social structure Social relations of production (e.g. class, differentiation, 
farming structure) 
Text/verbatim 
      Cultural heritage (e.g. caste, identity, common pool 
resources) 
Text/verbatim 
      Other Specify (text) 
INCENTIVE 
STRUCTURE 
FIRM INCENTIVES Incentive mentioned in 
the impact study 
Reliable quality and quantity 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Economies of scale in procurement 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Control of production and process and crop attributes 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Off-loading production risk 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Reputation (e.e. licence to operate) 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Intelectual property rights 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Contract management costs 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
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  ID Question Description Coding 
      Cost of non-compliance 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Other Specify (text) 
    Contract implementation 
issues 
  
Contract conditions used, refined or breached  Specidy(text_ 
    Other Specify (text) 
  FARMER INCENTIVES Farmer incentive 
structure 
Expected higher income 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Technical upgrading 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Access to markets 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Price risks 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Production risks 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Social risks 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Financial risks 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Increased market risks 1 = Relevant 
2 = Not relevant 
8 = Unclear relevance 
      Other Specify (text) 
    Contract implementation 
issues 
Contract conditions used, refined or breached Specify (text) 
   Other Specify)text) 
END FIFTH CODING BLOCK 
 64 
 
